IPSA
Journal
Of
Islamic
Studies
ISSUE
6, 1428 AH, 2007
Copyright
of this publication is held by the International Peace University of South
Africa [IPSA]
Copyright
of the articles in this journal vest with their respective authors
ISSN
1608-229X
All
views expressed here belong to their respective authors and do not necessarily
reflect the institutional views and policies of IPSA.
Address
all correspondence to:
The
Editor
IPSA
Journal of Islamic Studies
Gatesville
7766
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Contents
Ahmad Mukadam
Al-Tabannā -
Adoption 17
Abdul Karim Toffar
An overview of ijtihād
with particular reference to “neo-ijtihād”.
Hoosain Ebrahim
Ijtihād in Islamic law: its essence, scope, divisions, 36
appropriateness
and effect
Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būtī
The role of
Islamic media in combating the psychological 69
undermining
of contemporary Muslim society
Ahmad Abdul Malik
In this 6th issue of the IPSA Journal of
Islamic Studies the translated article by Dr Sa‘īd Ramaḍān
al-Būtī deals with the complex issue of ijtihād. There
has been a call to ijtihād
by those who believe that it has been stultified, resulting in a general
atrophy in Muslim thinking. Ḅūtī- coming from a traditionalist
perspective- masterly answers the charge and lays bare its naivety through a
presentation of the intricacies and nuances around the issue.
This complex discussion is preceded and complemented
by Shaykh Hoosain Ebrahim’s historical overview of the concept which provides a
neat orientation to the field, especially for uninitiated readers.
Shaykh Dr Abdul Karim Toffar presents an incisive,
historically critical analysis of the concept of adoption as commonly
understood, providing the reasons as to why it has no grounds in the Sharī‘ah
and introduces the alternative conception available in Islam.
In the first ever Arabic article published in the IPSA
Journal, Dr Ahmad Abdul Malik outlines elements of the psychological onslaught
against religious values, and Islamic values in particular, that can be found
in secular media and the concomitant need for an Islamic alternative.
This is also the first time that there are articles
that reflect upon IPSA itself. In this regard, IPSA’s rector, Mawlana Ahmad
Mukadam, contributes a stirring reflection on the need to invest in Muslim
education against a backdrop of misplaced communal priorities and bi-polar
vision. Dr Salie Abrahams deals with IPSA in a broader discussion of pluralism
in Islam. He draws on his expertise as professional psychologist to illuminate
the types of pluralism with which Islamic institutions like IPSA need to
engage.
A.
Rafudeen
PLATFORM
Du’ā and Dirham: Reflections on Education
and Economics
Ahmad Mukadam
I am not convinced that the contemporary Muslim
mind functions in an integrated manner when reflecting upon the relationship
between education and economics.
The early Prophetic model of
al-Madīnah clearly understood that economics (in this case the imbursement
and disbursement of funds) and piety enjoyed a seamless relationship.
We
therefore need to investigate the causes for such an unbalanced perception upon
which it does seem, Muslim finances and management, especially in the field of
Islamic education is now functioning. Most, if not all Muslim organizations and
institutions have subsistence budgets, hence the lack of definitive,
forward-looking, sustained development. Reactive and crisis-management models
seem to be the norm. Any keen observer soon gets the impression that piety,
qualified governance and money are non-operative values in contemporary Muslim
organization.
Piety,
(that is, being a good knowledgeable Muslim) and economic restitution and
balance in Prophetic society were mutually bound sets of ideas and praxis.
The
holy Messenger of Allah keenly understood the central importance of empowering
the nascent Medinian ummah
economically. When he arrived in
The
Prophet (SAW) systematically with clear planning and brilliant foresight, set
about through a series of negotiations, treaties, eventual expulsions and the
introduction of a very powerful instrument of economic-piety, ‘waqf’ (endowment), neutralizing the
hegemony of an impious economic system, and ceded money and food affairs to the
ownership of the ummah.
Being
a good, informed Muslim meant that money-power was pressed into the service of
piety or good works.
In
today’s capitalist values based and economically stratified society, piety or
morality in economics seems to have no place. The power-brokers of Muslim
society are secularized to the point that piety does not include economic
restitution. Muslim workers in Islamic education still largely remain grossly
underpaid, whilst money is amassed for personal satiation or misdirected
charity. Unashamedly more money will be pared into the material resources and a
fraction thereof is granted to the vital human resource aspects of Muslim
organizations and institutions.
This
article is calling for moving from the acknowledgement of this unsafe state of
affairs to formulating definitive steps to bring back the piety of actions to
money-management.
This
coming year at IPSA is the year of the teacher.
Let us make du’ā
and utilize the dirham!
Pluralism and the
Co-existence of Cultures
Dictate or Dialogue?
Introduction – Pluralism in
the 21st Century
The 1859 Charles Dickens novel, The Tale of Two
Cities, opens with the following now famous sentence: “It was the best of times
and it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of
foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it
was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the Spring of
hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing
before us, we were all going to heaven, we were all going the other way … ”. This opening sentence epitomizes the
situation of Islam in the first decade of the 21st Century.
Given the events of the recent past now is aptly the
best of times and the worst of times for Muslims. The tale of the two cities
also symbolizes the unfolding the notions of the two separate and disconnected
civilizations. Now if ever, polarization, narrow-mindedness and prejudice need
to be replaced with the exchange of ideas, discussion, dialogue, open-mindedness
and pluralism.
In this short essay we explore a contemporary
understanding of the notion of pluralism and its practical implications
regarding in general the teaching of religion, religion studies and in
particular regarding Islamic studies in the academic Islamic institutions. We
explore what pluralism and Islamic studies mean at established international
institutions as well as emergent Islamic institutions.
We briefly explore the practice concept of internal
institutional pluralism which I call Intra-Pluralism [1]
and external institutional Pluralism, which I call Inter-Pluralism [2].
We examine the newly established emergent
2006 places us at a particular edge regarding world
developments and tragic events such as the Occupation of Palestine, the
Invasion of Afghanistan, September 11, the invasion of Iraq, July 7 and the
invasion of Lebanon has brought religion and particularly Islam into public
debate in the media as well as academic institutions like never before. The
Contemporary Understanding of
the Notion of Pluralism
While there are many scholars based in Islamic and
Arab regions that have contributed to refine our understanding of the notion of
pluralism such as Rifa’ah Tahtawi, Muhammad ‘Abdu, Abdurrahman Al-Kawakibi and
the Egyptian lawyer and scholar Salim Al-Awwa [4]
to mention just a few. Most modern
scholarly ideas and concepts of pluralism seem to be mainly originating and
from those scholars that have straddled the continents, who research, teach and
live in societies where Muslims are in minority or in societies that are
surrounded by non-Muslim communities. Amongst the most erudite thinkers,
researchers and writers on pluralism are the British educated and
Arguing strongly
for pluralism and dialogue the Turkish scholar Kaymakcan [9]
argues that the realization of the futuristic and controversial thesis “clash
of civilizations” will not bring peace, tolerance, freedom and human rights.
Kaymakcan [10]
postulates that in order for this not to happen we need to instead develop an
understanding of others. Emphatic approaches to the evaluation of other
religions and beliefs are crucial. Interfaith approaches to religious education
will have to be increased.
Islam and
plurality must become part of Islamic education policy. Living together in the
21st century will mean an understanding of the other. Mousalli [11]
deals with Islam’s position on three specific modern concepts: democracy,
pluralism and human rights. He provides examples of how the Islamic position on
especially pluralism can easily be misunderstood, misrepresented or distorted
because of confusing Islam the religion with the Islam the political ideology,
or as a state that is the outcome of the Muslim human endeavor. Mousalli [12]
sees Islam as providing a set of values and guidelines. It enjoins or
encourages its adherents to follow a certain pattern of behavior and prohibits
or discourages them from pursuing the opposite. In the modern Islamist
expressions of Pluralism, he argues that Islamic thought was historically and
theoretically based on the notion of tolerating differences, manifested in the
adoption and tolerance of pluralistic approaches. Mousalli’s ideas is a must for students and scholars alike,
especially for those who wish to have a better understanding of the phenomenon
of Islamic revival. The model of the Islamic state, or order, set up by the
Prophet and pursued after him by the four Rightly Guided Caliphs is the
strategy to set as a standard. It is against that standard that subsequent
models of government and pluralistic practices are assessed and modern Islamic
political thought is investigated.
Tamimi [13]
is of the conviction that the term pluralism is a newcomer to the Islamic
lexicon. It may be traced to the writings of the 19th century
reformists, but reference to it can hardly be found in earlier writings. Tamimi
[14]
argues that he can find no evidence in support of the notion that, “Islamic thinkers who defend democracy and
pluralism, and who seek to prove them compatible with Islam, are apologetic or
are simply infatuated with the West”. He argues that the primary motivation of
such thinkers has been to respond to emergent civilizational challenges of the
modern era, motivated by a search for solutions to contemporary problems that
have not been dealt with adequately by classical thought.
According to Tamimi
the beginning of modern Islamic thinking in the Arab region is usually
traced to Rifa’ah Tahtawi in n his book Takhlis Al-Ibriz ila Talkhis Bariz
(1834). Tahtawi compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and
jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience. Tahtawi defined religious freedom and political
freedom the freedom of belief, of opinion and practice that does not contradict
the fundamentals of religion. Muslim thinkers for example, who promoted
democracy and defended pluralism sought to refute the claim that it would
undermine the unity of the Umma. Hassan Al-Banna (1904-1049), founded the Al-Ikhwan
Al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) founded in 1928 in the city of
Salim Al-Awwa [15],
a prominent Egyptian lawyer and an independent Islamic scholar, suggests that
pluralism is a natural phenomenon that no one can deny. He refers to the Holy
Qur’an to prove his point and quotes several verses that point to the diversity
of things in the universe and to the differences God has willed to be among
humans themselves in spite of the one origin from which they all descend.
The human race exhibits a plurality in ethnicity,
affiliations, responsibilities, performances, talents, faculties and powers. If
one recognises the pluralistic nature of humans beings, and recognises their
right to disagree and differ, one must inevitably recognise pluralism in the
political sphere. Al-Awwa, according to Tamimi, sees three reasons why Islamic
thought is sometimes misrepresented or misunderstood over the question of
pluralism:
1. The constraint imposed by taqlid (the unquestioning adoption of old opinions that may have
been suited for other times and other circumstances).
2. The attitude of selectivity when reviewing Islamic
history for lessons and precedents. For some people history is entirely bright
and idealistic whereas for others it is hopelessly gloomy and irrelevant.
3. The lack of innovative ijtihād within, as well as by, groups advocating Islamic-based
reform. Political pluralism is a necessity because it is not possible for any
political system to be set up in modern times while denying the people the
right to differ, to disagree and to exercise their rights to free expression
and assembly.
Rachid Ghannouchi [16],
founder and leader of Ennahda Movement in
Differences in belief, ethics
or politics – just like differences in tongues and colours – do not justify the
quest to eliminate them by force since that will violate one of the purposes of
divine creation. God, has willed them to be different. Therefore, no
contradiction could exist between pluralism and the Islamic creed of
monotheism. It would in other words be wrong to think that monotheism is
opposed to difference or that it is incompatible with the freedom of choice and
thus with democracy. It is thus by virtue of the fact that Islam had acknowledged
the phenomenon of difference as a natural universal phenomenon that it did not
have a history of religious wars, missions of ethnic or religious cleansing or
cultural genocide. The tolerance exhibited by Islam has in other words been the
consequence of its recognition of diversity.
In an Islamic state,
Ghannouchi stresses that no authority
has the right to impose one religion or eliminate certain other religions. The
task of an Islamic political order would merely be to see that social and religious
relations are harmonised through dialogue, consultation and consensus. In other
worlds, different groups may be permitted to voice their opinions and campaign
for public support in an organised fashion and through the use of peaceful
means. As for religious and ideological differences that are not resolved in
this world through dialogue and mutual understanding, God will settle all
differences on the Day of Judgement.
Many Islamic scholars agree that there is enough
evidence in the holy Qur’an that support inter-faith and cultural dialogues and
pluralism. The classic verse from the Holy Qur'an is often used to justify and
encourage this approach: “O Mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of
male and female and made you into nations and tribes that ye may know each
other (not despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of
Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge
and is well acquainted (with all things)” (Qur’an 49: 13) .
The Qur’an also states: “To each among you
have We prescribed a Law and an open way. If Allah had so willed, He would have
made you a single people, but (His plan is) to test you in what He has given
you. So strive as in a race in all virtues.” (Qur’an 5:48]
Pluralism and Practice
In a world of intolerance, mistrust, despair and the
projection of war and catastrophe the notion of the “Clash of Civilization” is
largely accepted, but this is not a fait
accompli, not an accepted destiny. There is much hope and optimism for
peace, acceptance and celebration of diversity, understanding, tolerance and
freedom from prejudice. Muslims can play an active role to avert the
catastrophe of the clash of cultures. We need to be vigilant but we can do much
consciously or unconsciously to increase strife, tension and intolerance by
what we teach and how we teach in our academic institutions. We live in a
pluralistic world; there are many diverse belief systems, distinct faiths and
distinctive cultures. We have choices and we could, in our Islamic institutions
either recoil and fear differences or connected with other cultures and
celebrate diversity. Islamic institutions in my view simply have no other
choice. We have to connect with other cultures to celebrate diversity, the
consequences of not doing so, is too ghastly to contemplate.
Islam is an integral part of this world and critical
and selective assimilation from other cultures and civilizations has been part
of Islam since the beginning. The
teaching of religion and religious studies has to incorporate the celebration
of this diversity. The strategic and cultural importance of higher education
cannot be over emphasized. It is clear from history that the spirit and ethos
as well as the overall quality of a particular nation or civilization are rooted
and reflected in its institutions of higher learning.
As each nation or civilization becomes influential it
tends to develop leading intellectual centers of its world. Islamic
institutions have an important strategic and cultural role and responsibility to bring about these
intellectual qualities.
Contextual and Contractual
Pluralism
The practice of Pluralism in Islamic institutions
needs to be contextual as well as contractual. Contextual-Pluralism refers to situations where Muslims do not have
an impact or control over that which influences the contextual environment.
They then engage in efforts of a pluralistic nature to encounter the context by
being communicative, engaging in dialogue and reaching out to others, rather
than building isolating fortresses and having a laager mentality. This is
particularly relevant to situations in many regions of the world, where Muslims
have minority status or lack a strong voice or economic power in a particular
society. Muslims living in
Contractual-Pluralism refers to
situations where Muslims are in power and or have a large degree of impact or
control over their environment and that which influences their situation. Muslims and Islamic educational
institutions in these contexts then
engage in efforts of a pluralistic nature to encounter the context by being
bold, legislating for example in strongly pro-Islamic ways, without endangering
relations with those who are non-Muslim.
Here Muslims provide national leadership that
celebrate diversity, develop inter-cultural communication and understanding.
Islamic universities in these situations can provide intellectual leadership
not only inside a particular situation or country or nation but also to the
Muslim communities who live in situations where they are in minority, without a
political voice and who live under oppressive regimes in Muslim or non-Muslim
countries. Islamic institutions and universities, for example, in
Intra-Pluralism and
Inter-Pluralism.
Institutions of higher education and Islamic
universities need to implement the notion of pluralism in theory and in
practice. The conception of this praxis of pluralism has internal,
intra-pluralism connotations as well as external inter-pluralism, connotations
for both established and emergent Islamic academic institutions (of course for
Muslim individuals as well). The conception
of Intra-Pluralism implies that all aspects of the internal
affairs of Islamic institutions need to be compliant with the inspiration of
pluralism, openness to dialogue, the celebration of diversity and the
acceptance of others. These inspirations need to be pervasive and permeate the
Islamic higher institutions’ ideology, personnel, policies and academia and
curricula in an internally consistent manner.
Similarly, the conception of Inter-Pluralism implies
that all aspects of the external affairs of Islamic educational institutions
need to be compliant with the inspiration of pluralism, dialogue, the
celebration of diversity and the acceptance of others. Again, these
inspirations need to be pervasive and permeate our Islamic institutions’
ideology, relationships with other Islamic and non-Islamic educational,
religious, political, social and economic institutions in a manner that is
externally consistent. The praxis, the practice of steadfast intra and
inter-pluralism can ensure in these modern times, we are inspired by dialogue
and are able to bring about the kind of changes that is needed for Muslims to
play a pivotal role for peace and understanding in the 21st
Century.
The International
The International Peace University South Africa (IPSA)
as an emergent institution needs to steadfastly implement and the practice
notion of pluralism. The conception of the praxis of pluralism has internal,
intra-pluralistic as well as external, inter-pluralistic, connotations. This
pluralistic dialogue of IPSA has included local, national and international
outreach, building bridges of dialogue, cooperation and understanding with
educational institutions and universities. Memoranda of understanding have been
entered into with local universities as well as universities in South East
Asia, in particular
Outreach and dialogue has also turned towards the
West, the
IPSA is also engaged in Sectoral- Pluralism with dialogue outside of academia. We are
engaged in dialogue of a political nature and have nurtured working
relationships with the Office of Premier of the
Conclusion: Adjustments and
Alignments Dialogue not Dictates.
Islamic institutions in the 21st century
have a great responsibility to ensure that the time ahead is not a “Season of
Darkness but a Season of Light, not a Time of Despair, but a Time of Hope, not
an Era of Foolishness but an Era of Wisdom” [17]
and that wisdom implies a time of reaching out to become part of the other
while sustaining our individuality and our heritage. Islam by it very nature is
pluralistic and pluralism is what we have to pursue. We have choices to make.
We can recoil in apprehension of differences or connected with others and
celebrate diversity.
Where Muslims are in minority and not in positions of
power, we need to strategize and manoeuvre as well as reach out and engage in
dialogue. Where Muslims are in the majority and in powerful positions we must
utilize the position of power to promote Islamic values and not be dogmatic and
dictate. Pluralism in Islamic institutions needs to be contextual as well as
contractual. Now if ever, polarization, narrow-mindedness and prejudice need to
be replaced with the exchange of ideas, discussion, dialogue, open-mindedness
and pluralism. Adjustments and alignments, which promote pluralism in both the
content and the process of the academic curriculum of Islamic institutions,
will have to be made. We must not become victims of our circumstances but
rather masters of our own destiny.
Al-Tabannā -
Adoption[18]
Abdul
Karim Toffar
The word tabannā
(adoption) is derived from the Arabic word banā
from which the word ibn (son) is
derived. Tabannā means “to take
someone as your child”.[19]
There are various other definitions of adoption. Some authorities define it as
“the institutional practice through which an individual belonging by birth to
one kinship group, acquires new kinship ties that are socially defined as
equivalent to congenital ties.”[20]
Another defines it as “the creation of a relationship of a parent and child
between individuals who do not naturally have that bond.”[21]
Tizard sums it up plainly in her definition when she says that: “The essence of
adoption is that a child not born to you
is incorporated into your family as though he were your own.”[22]
From the definitions quoted, it is clear that adoption
is an artificial act of creating “natural” family ties due to “common social
acceptance” thereof. In fact, it is an unnatural act in the sense that it
usurps the natural position and rights of natural biological parents and the
“acquired” parents are made the real lawful parents.
Adoption was an ancient practice in the ancient Near
Eastern civilisations of the second millennium. The Bible, according to some
scholars, has traces of this custom.[23]
Soran, founder of
A further Biblical metaphorical adoption is that which
existed between Yahweh (God in
Hebrew) and the Israelites, they being the “children” of Yahweh; “And you (Moses) shall say to Pharaoh, thus say the Lord:
Israel is my first born son and I say to you; Let my son go that he may serve
me”.[32]
Also, “Is he not your father who created you…”[33]
The New Testament continues this metaphorical theme
further when Paul says: “…that we are the children of God…”[34]and:
“… so that we may receive adoption as sons.”[35] A similar thought is expressed elsewhere in
the Bible.[36] The
thought and practice of adoption is thus not foreign to the Judeo-Christian
faith which forms the majority of people of the modern, democratic and liberal
western world. Despite Old Testament narrations, adoption among ancient Jews
was rare due to unlimited polygyny being lawful as well as freedom to divorce
and to remarry. Childlessness was thus rare. Rabbis rule that “who ever raises
an orphan in his home is deemed by Scripture as his parent” citing Naomi taking
Obed as her son as she reared him.[37]
This is disputed.
However, the legal concept of adoption finds no place
whatsoever in biblical and Talmudic jurisprudence. Voluntary acceptance of
another parent’s child, rendered him your child and although Jewish law gave no
formal recognition to adoption, voluntary assumption of parents existed even in
ancient times. According to Jewish tradition, it is a privilege to give proper
education and upbringing to parentless boys of unusual ability and promise.[38]Adoption
is thus an unknown legal institution in Jewish law. Halakah (the legal part of the Talmudic and later Jewish
literature)[39]rules
that personal status of parent and child is based on the natural family
relationship only and, thus, there is no way artificial relationships can be
created legally or by fiction. A guardian is appointed to look after the
welfare and upbringing of a parentless Jewish child, but the rights of the
natural parents are in no way affected by this process, which some call
“adoption”. It is, actually, in practice, fostering.
Modern day
South African common law, being the Roman Dutch law,
has an evolved system of adoption.
In Roman law, two systems existed. One was androgatio which marked the extinction
of one family in order to perpetuate another and continued observing its sacra (house gods worship). Androgatio was a precursor of testation
which allowed the paterfamilias
(family head) to artificially create an heir during his lifetime. A pontifical
assembly, the comitia curiata, under
the Pontifex Maximus together with
the androgator (one making the androgatio) and the androgatus (one entering androgatio)
had to agree on the androgatio..
Women had no part herein initially, but Antonius Pius opened their way by
allowing androgatio by rescript. When
androgatio was properly completed,
the androgatus and all his family
came under the control of the new paterfamilias.
Later an adoption process came into being. This was
the transfer of a person from an alien family to the control of another and had
to be confirmed by a magistrate and recorded in the court’s archives. The
emperor’s permission was also required. Initially, women could not adopt but
Diocletian changed that “so as to be a solace for them in their bereavement”.
Justinian retained this. Adoption only affected the adoptee (one adopted). If
the adoptee had children, they would remain under the control of their pater (family head). In Roman law, the
adoptee had no claim to his former pater,
nor succession right to his estate save as a cognate where the praetorian
succession scheme was applied.[41]
Although Roman law accepted adoption which was widely
practised, Roman Dutch law did not. Adoptions existed in
An adoption order confers the surname of the adoptive
parent on the adoptive child who then becomes the legitimate child of the
adoptive parents.[44]
However, an adopted child cannot marry
his adoptive parent nor can sexual relations exist between them as that would
tantamount to incest.[45]
It is interesting to note that that prior to 1960, there was no prohibition of
marriage between the adopted child and adoptive parent on condition that the
child was not less than 21 years of age.[46]
Adoption existed and was prevalent in pre-Islamic
When he (s.a.w) married Khadījah bint Khuwailid
(r.a.), his first wife, she gave him a male slave called Zaid bin
al-Ḥārithah, whom he (s.a.w|) immediately set free calling him Zaid
bin Muḥammad[47].
Zaid became of the choicest ṣaḥābah
of the nabī (s.a.w) during the
prophetic era.
Later the pre-Islamic system of adoption was abolished
by Islām. Islām and its family and personal laws recognizes a nikāḥ shar`ī (Muslim
marriage) as the only institution in society in which intimacy and procreation
can take place. There is, thus, a system of nasab
and descent from and belonging to someone. Family relationships, in Islām,
is thus based on affinity and consanguinity.[48]
Before proceeding , it is necessary to understand what nasab really mean in Islām.
Nasab has to do with the
relationship of children to their father as far as legitimacy is concerned.[49]
It is forbidden to claim parentage from a man who is not your real legitimate
father. Abī Waqqāṣ narrated that the nabī (s.a.w) said: “whosoever claims fatherhood from a man and
he knows that that man is not his father, paradise is forbidden for him.”[50] Al-Bukhārī and Muslim transmit the
ḥadīth: “whoever claims
fatherhood from other than his (own) father, on him is the curse of Allāh and all the angels and all
the people. Allāh does not
accept from him any repentance nor any penitary compensation.”[51]
Parentage is thus by valid nikāḥ and nasab
one of its legal consequences. The nabī
(s.a.w) ruled: ”Al-walad li
al-firāsh” – a child (born in a marriage) is attributed to the married
partners.[52] Besides this, an individual’s nasab is confirmed if his father does nor
negate his nasab to him by mulā`anah (mutual imprecation) in
which case he is actually accusing his wife of zina (adultery) or it is proven by acceptable evidence in sharī`ah that such a child has nasab to a another man.[53] A
child’s nasab is also established if
a man accepts such a child as his own and there is evidence for such a claim.[54] In sunnī
law a child is never illegitimate to his natural mother.[55]
The abrogation of al-tabannā
by sharī`ah had to be clear,
unambiguous and irrevocable and as such the
Zaid bin al-Ḥārithah, known as Zaid bin
Muḥammad, mawlā of the nabī
(s.a.w) was married off to the cousin of the nabī (s.a.w), Zainab bint Jaḥsh, a noble Qurashite woman
by the nabī (s.a.w) himself.
Perhaps the nabī (s.a.w)
intended to draw Zaid closer to his familial line with this marraige. That
marriage was doomed to die due to Arab indifference to freed slaves and their
poor standing in Arab society then. Divorce was inevitable. The nabī (s.a.w) tried hard to
forestall it but failed. Zainab made the nikāḥ
a physical situation and nothing more. This situation is untenable and
uncondonable in sharī`ah. One of
the basic laws of nikāḥ,
in Islām, is imsāk bi-ma`rūf aw
tasrīḥ bi iḥsān – remaining married and keeping the
laws of nikāḥ or
separating amicably if this cannot be done[57].
Ṭalāq had to follow as the case
became hopeless, even with the nabī
(s.a.w) intervening and trying to save it. This caused him (s.a.w) anguish. To
add to this anguish, the nabī
(s.a.w) was commanded by Allāh
to marry Zainab after her divorce, something unheard of in Arab society as
adopted children became your own children which disallowed marriage to their
spouses by their in-laws. Thus was revealed: ”Behold! You said to the one who
has received the grace of Allāh
and your favour, retain (in wedlock)
your wife and fear Allāh. But
you (Muḥammad) did hide in your heart that which Allāh was about to make manifest; you feared the people but it
was more fitting that you should fear Allāh.
Then when Zaid had dissolved (his marriage) with her, We enjoined her in
marriage to you in order that (in future) there may be no difficulty to
believers in (the matter of) marriage
with the wives of their adopted sons, when the latter have dissolved (the
marriage) with them. And Allāh’s command
must be fulfilled”.[58]
The issue of adopted children and their position in
law became very clear now. The
The nabī’s own
sons all predeceased him before even
reaching puberty. He thus had no sons[60].
The Qur’ān
confirms this: “Muḥammad is not the father of any of your men, but (he
is) the Messenger of Allāh and
the seal of all the prophets…”[61]
As indicated above, al-tabannā is not a natural act and sharī`ah subscribes to this view. No speech or act can undo this natural fact.
However, sharī`ah
did not overlook the plight of minor children who are in need of care or the
charity of childless couples in offering the gift of substitute parenthood,
love care and affection to those who have never known parentage or whose
parents are unknown to those unfortunate children that had been abandoned or
deserted by their natural parents. Nor did sharī`ah
overlook the magnanimity of parents with children who wish to give the gift of
love, affection, care and upbringing to a parentless child.
Islām accepts and encourages kafālah al-muḥtāj (protection of the needy) or al-kafālah fī al-ri’āyah wa al-tarbiyah
(protection in upbringing and education).[62] In fact, it is the duty f every Muslim
society as a whole to see to theses children in need. The
“Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allāh; and those who are with him
are firm[63] against
the unbelievers (but) compassionate among on another”…[64]
Also, “The believers are but a single brotherhood, so make peace and
reconciliation between yourselves…”[65]
and ”And they feed for the love of Allāh,
the indigent, the orphan and the captive.”[66]
Also ”…To spend of your substance, out of love for Him, for your kin, for
orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for beggars and for the ransom of
slaves.”[67] Thus, to assert that Islām, in not permitting al-tabannā, is indifferent to the plight of parentless
children, is totally erroneous.
The nabī
(s.a.w) himself gave several instructions to the muslimūn in their social relationships. Of these is what
Abū Mūsā narrated that he (s.a.w) said: ”The muslimūn are like a brick wall, one
strengthens and supports the other one.”[68] Abū Hurairah narrated, as transmitted
by Muslim and al-Tirmidhī that the nabī
(s.a.w) said: “be the servants of Allāh
as brothers; the Muslim is the brother of the other Muslim – he does not do him
injustice nor betray him nor despise him…”[69] Further, `Ā’ishah (r.a) narrated from
the nabī (s.a.w) that he said:
“Verily Allāh is most kind and
gentle and loves kindness and gentleness…”[70]
Islām, thus, while not condoning al-tabannā, encourages and exhorts, nay, commands the care and
upbringing of parentless children or foundlings. Out of Faith, love and
affections, such children are to be cared for and looked after for the sake of Allāh and for a safe social order
and not for any material reason or gain. Islām thus allows fostering.
These children, as shown previously, must retain their family name and as such
will always belong to the parents from whom they were born. Due to this, the
duties and obligations as well as rights and privileges between these natural
persons remain. The fostering parent will thus never have the right to deny the
fostered child to know his natural parents nor restrain him from returning to
them should such a child voluntarily wish to do so. The only time when
intervention can take place in this matter, is when the child is still a minor
and his interest is not served by being with his natural parent or parents. The
qāḍī decides this
issue on application of the fostering person or any other member of the muslimūn. It is also clear that a
fostered child is not an adopted child of the fostering parent nor a
“manufactured” natural child in the first place.
In terms of the laws of al-mawārīth al-shar`īyyah (Islamic succession laws),
a fostered child does not succeed as a wārith
(heir) of his foster parents by way of a naṣīb (share), but he may receive from the permissible waṣīyyah (legacy/bequest) of
such a parent. Such a waṣīyyah
should not exceed one third of the deceased estate to be executed unchallenged
by the succeeding warathah (heirs) of
such a deceased.[71][53]
Theoretically, thus, a fostered child may receive a
greater share, in real terms, than a legitimate natural child of a parent. This
again shows the concern and interest Islām has in foster children.
Some arguments had been raised, notably by Muslim
“secularists” and “progressives”, that adoption found place in the law of
Muslim lands, namely
An overview of ijtihād with particular reference to “neo-ijtihād”.
Hoosain Ebrahim
1. Introduction
Ijtihād is proven to be a significant source of
Islamic law. This exertion of mental
energy is acknowledged by the primary sources of the law. In this exercise we will witness that Ijtihād was not only practiced by
the Prophet, but continued after his demise and is still practiced in Islamic
countries today (neo-ijtihād). However, we have scholars that believe the
door of ijtihād had closed,
which is discussed briefly in this essay.
Toward the end of the 19th century
al-Afghani, ‘Abduh and later scholars favoured the reinterpretation of the
principles included in the sacred revelation as a means of legal reform. Subsequently, we have many Islamic countries
practicing neo-ijtihād
(re-interpretation) in the area of al-Siyāsah
al-Sharī‘yyah [legal expediency] of which we will provide some
examples.
2. Brief definition
The word ijtihād
is derived from the Arabic root jahada,
literally meaning to strive, or to exert oneself in any exercise which
entails a measure of hardship. However,
as far as the jurists are concern, ijtihād
is an intellectual and not a physical exertion (Kamali, 1991:367).
Its technical definition is as follows: “ In legal usage it refers to the endeavour
of a jurist to formulate a rule of law on the basis of evidence (dalīl) found in the sources” (Weiss, 1978:200).
3. Exercise of judgement acknowledged by Quran
and
Tradition
The Quran and Tradition are explicit in commanding and
encouraging the utilizing of intellect and the exercise of judgement.
3.1 Quran
The question of reason and the exercise of judgment
are strongly emphasized in the Quran and corroborated by scholars. According to Ali(1983:97-98)the following
well-known and frequently occurring phrases of the Quran indicate this: “Do
you not understand?” “there are signs in this for a people who reflect”, “have
you no sense?” More specifically, the Quran states, And if they had referred it to the Messenger
and to those in authority among them, those of them who can search out the
knowledge of it would have known it” (Quran,4:83),
Amidi asserts that “Qur’anic summons to think and
reflect are universal and include all humans” (Rahman, 1964:161). In fact, according to Al-Shāṭibī,
a mujtahid is to follow what his ijtihād leads him to, provided this
ijtihād is not in conflict with
the objectives of the Law-Giver.
3.2
Tradition
The Prophet’s tradition acknowledges the exercise of
judgment (ijtihād) in religious
matters when there is no ruling in the Qur’an and Tradition (Ali,
1983:98). The following Tradition is the
basis of ijtihād in Islam and
can also be regarded as the “origin of the development of the theme of ijtihād in Islam”.
When the Prophet sent Mu’ādh b. Jabal as judge to
This tradition shows that the Prophet approved the
exercise of judgment and that Mu’ādh b. Jabal knew the principles related
to this source (Ali, 1983:98-99).
4. Developments and decline
of ijtihad
4.1 Origin
Muslim scholars agree that the Prophet had Prophetic
license in practicing ijtihād in
worldly affairs. However, there are
differences of opinion among the scholars as to whether the Prophet utilized ijtihād in religious matters.
The Prophet advised the date farmers of
When disagreements and disputes arose among the early
Muslim community and non-Muslims of
Umm Salmah narrated that the Prophet said: “I judge between you upon my personal opinion
about matters for which no revelation came to me from God
(Gamieldien,1993:18-19).
However, Al-Ghazāli and others believe that all
judgments and decisions of the Prophet came directly via revelation. This however, is debatable as the Prophet’s
personal judgments differed at times with revelation (Gamieldien, 1993:23).
After the Prophet’s demise, the exercise of judgment
became more acute because new areas were added to the material and spiritual
domain of Islam (Ali, 1983:99). This was
the beginning of the Caliphate era.
4.2
Caliphate era
According to al-Suyūti, in his History of the
Caliphs, when a case appeared before
Abū Bakr he would first consult the Quran, if no solutions were found in
the Quran then he would consult Tradition. If he was unable to find anything in
the practice of the Prophet, then he would make a decision on agreed opinion
(by majority of Companions).
‘Umar also exercised ijtihād freely, but took great care in consulting the most
learned companions; decisions of the majority were exercised on condition that
it was not contrary to the Quran and practice of the Prophet. Among others, the opinion of Ibn ‘Abbās,
Ibn ‘Umar and Ā‘ishah were greatly respected. (Ali, 1983:99-100).
In the second century of the Hijrah period arose the
illustrious jurists who followed the judgments and decisions of Khulafā Rāshidūn while developing the various modes of ijtihād with which they have become
affiliated.
4.3
Jurists development of ijtihad
4.3.1
Abū Ḥanīfah
Abū Ḥanīfah did not only exercise ijtihād, but unfolded and
established different methods of ijtihād
which gave the jurist comprehensive scope to solve legal questions. Abū Hanīfah makes a clear
distinction between the text (naṣṣ)
concerning ‘ibādat and mu‘amalāt. As a rule he mainly exercised ijtihād issues concerning mu‘amalāt, that is, public dealings
and social affairs (Faruqi, undated:6-7).
Ali says: “It was he who first directed attention to
the great value of analogical reasoning (qiyas) in legislation. He also laid down the principle of equity,
whereby not only could new laws be made, but even logical conclusions could be
controverted when proved inequitable.
(Ali, 1983:101).
However, there were many legal, social and political
issues which were difficult to solve through the method of qiyas. According to
Goldziher, Abū Ḥanīfah was the first jurist to encounter this
difficulty, and introduced the principle of istihsān
[application of discretion in a legal decision]. This method provided the
jurists an opportunity to exercise ijtihād
based on the welfare of people. This
principle is particularly observed in the works of Abū Yūsuf (Faruqi,
undated:6-7).
4.3.2
Imām Mālik
The principle of Ijtihād
is not well developed and systematic in the fiqh
of Mālik. However, the method of qiyās is repeatedly utilized in fiqh issues and corresponding
conclusions are also extracted from the Sunnah by Mālik in his
authoritative treatise, al-Muwaṭṭah. Mālik also discusses several rules based
on qiyās in al-Mudawwanah al-Kubrā, which demonstrates that qiyas is a
legal principle in his thought.
(Faruqi.1983:10).
Malik does not confine himself to the method of qiyās. He has taken the advantage of the Ḥanafī
principle of Istiḥsān,
which he believes is a source of knowledge.
He adds considerably to the field
of Ijtihād by establishing the
doctrine of al-maṣāliḥ
al-mursalah (public interest) (Faruqi, :9-12; Ali,1983:102).
4.3.3
Al-Shāfi‘ī and ibn Hanbal
Al-Shāfi‘ī utilizes Ijtihād if there is no guidance in the Qur’an, Sunnah or Ijmā‘
(scholarly consensus). However, he
accepts reasoning by analogical deduction (qiyās)
only and excludes other forms of ijtihād.
At the same time, among the four A’immah
it was probably he who gave the greatest impetus to the study of legal
principles, of which ijtihād is
such an important component: “Explicit
legal reasoning occupies a much more prominent place in Shafi’i’s doctrine than
in that of any of the earlier lawyers…”(Schacht, 1967:315).
Aḥmad Ibn Hanbal made concessions to human
reasoning only when it was necessary and where possible derived every law from
scripture (Hallaq, 1984:8-10).
By the beginning of the fourth century Hijrah, Muslims
are alleged to have ‘closed the gate’ of Ijtihād.
4.4
“Decline” of ijtihad
There is a well-known thesis in the Islamic world that
‘the gate of Ijtihād was closed’.[79] There is no evidence, when it was closed and
who closed it, and the necessity of closing the gate of Ijtihād. There are
however, judgments of later writings that the ‘gate of Ijtihad has been closed’
(Rahman, 1964:149). It appears from the
above report that thinking as a general rule must have lapsed in the Islamic
world.
To continue the thesis: by the beginning of the fourth
century Hijrah, scholars felt that all essential questions had been finally
settled and no one might reckon to have the qualifications for independent
reasoning in law. All future undertaking
had to be restricted to the interpretation of the doctrine, as it had been laid
down. The closing of the door of Ijtihād meant the unquestioning
acceptance of established schools (taqlīd)
and authorities (Schacht, 1964:69-71).
Jamāl ud-dīn Al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh
are often regarded as the ones who initiated the new era of neo-ijtihād.
(Ghanem, 1983:87)However, a precursor to Islamic legal reform can be found in
the nineteenth century with the Majallah,
proclaimed by the
5.1 Neo-ijtihād and the
concept of al-siyāsah al-shar‘īyyah [legal expediency]
According to Doi (1981:46-48), al-Siyāsah al-Shar‘īyyah is a technique through which
certain reforms were implemented in Sharī‘ah as a means to escape from
stringent
5.2 Origin and early examples
of al-siyāsah al-shar‘īyyah
Al-Siyāsah al Sharī‘yyah was exercised as early as the reign of
‘Umar, the second caliph of Islam. For example, ‘Umar did not follow the ruling
of amputation for theft during a year of famine. In another example: according
to the Sunnah the penalty for fornication is one hundred lashes and to be
exiled for one year. However, when ‘Umar exiled Rabī‘a ibn Umayyah ibn
Khalaf and the latter joined the Byzantines, who were at war with the Muslims,
he did not apply the rule again to ensure that no Muslim would desert to the
enemy. (Ghanem, 1983:89).
It is on the basis of such examples, that neo-ijtihad (re-interpretation) in the
sphere al-Siyāsah al Shar‘īyyah
finds its legitimacy. The following are illustrations of its application in
Muslim countries in the twentieth century.
5.2.1 Prohibition of polygamy
& criterion for bigamy
Section 18 of Tunisian Law (1957) states that since
the equal handling of two wives is a condition of the
In
The Iraqi Law of Personal Status 1959 followed the
Syrian example. In a similar manner, the Pakistani Muslim Family Laws Ordinance
1961 requires the approval of the arbitration council, which will grant
permission if the second marriage is just and necessary. ( Ghanem, 1983:92-93)
( Coulson, 1978:208-209)
Divorce also has a procedure to follow.
5.2.2 Divorce
According to Tunisian Law, divorce can only have
effect through the judicial system and could be granted subject to the
following:
Syrian Law safeguards the wife who has been divorced
unjustly, by means of the former husband compensating her for a maximum term of
one year. This ruling is based on the Qur’anic injunction whereby the husbands
are instructed to “ make fair provisions” for divorced wives and to “ retain
wives with kindness or release them with consideration.” (Coulson, 1978:209)
Egyptian reforms gave the wife the right to demand a
judicial separation of her marriage if her husband is inflicted with a harmful
disease, injured her by long absence, failed to support her, or treated her in
an unbearable way ( Anderson, 1956:46). Other reforms in
6. Conclusion
This overview has shown that Ijtihād was regarded necessary in legal matters since the era
of the Prophet. With the apparent closing of the doors of Ijtihād there
appears to have been a decline in independent thinking in the Islamic world.
Thus many scholars asserted that all essential questions had been finally
settled and that no one might have the qualifications for independent reasoning
in law. The apparent closing of the door
of Ijtihād led to a greater
emphasis on taqlīd. With the
advent of the modernist movement in Islam, the necessity of Ijtihād was once again emphasised
and put into practice.
Neo-Ijtihād, in my opinion, can play a meaningful role
in the development of the law in Islamic countries and societies as long as
these countries are not trying to compete with Western legal systems. Islamic law comprises every aspect of human
life and makes available adequate tools in searching for and understanding the
divine commands and prohibitions in any era.
Therefore, neo-ijtihād can
be exercised, but must be driven by Islam and not outside pressures.
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Ali, M.M - 1983.
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Ahmadiyya anjuman isha’at Islam
The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal
Theory ( vol 32, no1)
Doi, A.R.I. 1981
Shari’ah in the 1500Century of Hijra
Ta-Ha
Publishers Ltd,
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Hamdard
Islamicus Vol 15 no3
Gamieldien, M.F. 1993 Ijtihad in the time of
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Outlines of Islamic Jurisprudence
Saudia
Publishing & Distributing House, Saudia
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Ijtihad
The American Journal of Comparative Law
Ijtihād in Islamic law: its essence, scope, divisions, appropriateness and
effect[80]
Dr Sa‘īd
Ramḍān al-Būtī[81]
Introduction[82]
We must now introduce the reader to a rarified
academic topic and thereby plunge into the deluge of technical terminology and
principles connected to Islamic law.
This topic is a serious scientific enquiry into the
purport of the word ijtihād- a word passionately discussed and
espoused by the followers of whatever is in vogue. These are those-all of them-
who agree to put one foot on the boat of Islam and its law on condition that it
confirms where their other foot is already set - on the boat of modern,
evolving culture. One of the duties of the
mujtahidūn in Islamic law is to expend their intellectual powers in
what ensures the co-existence of these two boats on their perpetual journeying
in order that they carry our protagonists in peace and safety!
Perhaps such are ignorant of
the meaning of ijtihād legislated by Allah. Indeed He has imposed
it as a duty in many circumstances. Perhaps they do not know its
characteristics, limits or effects. Because of this they imagine that it is a
magical key for the realization of every dream and the permissibility of every
taboo, the opening of the all doors and the removal of all barriers! Yes, perhaps
they are ignorant of its true purport and therefore indulge in such fancies.
But we are required to think well of them and will not suspect them of
deliberate ignorance.
Given this, the solution of
the difficulty lies in the unravelling of the reality of ijtihād in Islam
and an explanation of the rulings and other matters connected to it. This is in
order that we demonstrate to these brothers and sisters that the ijtihād legislated by Allah is not
an expression for such a wonderful, magical key. Thus it does not provide a
refuge for whoever desires to flee from firmly established Islamic
requirements, nor does it fortify modern, evolving culture- a fortifying that
can be against the requirements of Islam itself.
So please be patient, dear
reader- especially those who find in ijtihād
a liberal refuge against what they see as the rigidity of the law (fiqh) or its principles (uṣūl)- in their pursuit of
its scientific, adequate definition [in this essay]. This task is indeed
incumbent upon us and perhaps in establishing what it truly is we too will
considerably benefit.
What
is ijtihād and what are its special characteristics?
The scholars, in defining ijtihād, say that it is the
expending of the utmost effort in comprehending legal rulings (al-aḥkām al-sharī‘ah).
Their manner of stating or expressing this definition might differ from one
another but they all agree upon its purport.[83]
It is important, when looking
at this definition and its examples, to observe that at first glance the
definition is adequate to account for the efforts expended by judges and legal
scholars in the fixing and interpretation of laws as well as the efforts
expended by scholars of society, economics and history in comprehending the
manifold definitions connected to their disciplines.
There are no restrictions in
such [non-Islamic forms of] ijtihād except in modifying the scope
of the definition to suit the discipline under consideration- but ijtihād in the sphere of legal rulings differs
substantially from other forms of ijtihād. These differences are
manifested in two aspects which are characteristic only of legal ijtihād:
(1)
That it is an independent act of worship itself.
Through its employment the mujtahid
[legist] realises the pleasure of his Lord. By carrying its burden he hopes for
divine reward and forgiveness of sins and shortcomings.
(2)
That ijihād
in Islamic law, whatever its type, revolves around the axis of the Qur’ān
and Sunnah. It remains bound to these texts, subservient and concentrated upon
them. This is because ijtihād,
whatever the issue, cannot but fail to be a clarification for the extent of the
text’s continuing soundness and durability, or to make clear to us its meanings
and the implication of its indications. In the case of this second aspect there
also enter issues involving the generality or specificity of texts, their
absolute or restricted nature, their tractability to interpretation, and their
rationale. Rulings taken from the text revolve around all these factors.
Indeed that is not called knowledge in the
terminology of Islamic law which is not based on reports that have reached us
from Allah and His Messenger. This is since without them knowledge of Islamic
law cannot be called knowledge. Rather it cannot fail to be annoying whimsical
fancies.
Regarding this, Imām
Shāfi‘ī, Allah be pleased with him, says: “No one can ever call
something “permitted” or “forbidden” except from the perspective of knowledge.
The perspective of knowledge are the reports found in the Book of Allah, or the
Sunnah, or through ijmā’ (scholarly consensus) or qiyās
(analogy).”[84]
It is known that both ijmā’ and qiyās are indications of the text [meaning the Qur’ān and
Sunnah]. They cannot be established or activated except through the text.
And if it were allowed that
the scope of ijtihād be widened to overstep the boundaries of the
text and its indicators, then it would be permitted for this ijtihād itself to completely
invalidate the rule of the Sharī‘ah-
and to substitute through its exercise one thing after another taken from a
different Sharī‘ah.
Al-Shāṭibī has
clarified this fact when he very insightfully remarks:
“If it is permitted for reason
(‘aql) to overstep the bounds of transmission (naql), then it is
permitted for the
Al-Māwardī- with
respect to this fact- has contained ijtihād
under seven categories, all of them revolving around the determination of the
text, or in extracting the effective cause in a textual ruling (‘illah), or in precisely defining its
indications, or in preferring between the various meanings conveyed or in
clarifying its general or specific intent.[86]
The agitated call to ijtihād that emerges from some
quarters today, oversteps what they term “the narrow confines of the text” to
enter what they express as its “freed spirit”. However, such impudent
terminology is in reality a call to overstep the totality and integrity of
What, then, is the connection
between this undertaking and ijtihād
proper (al-ijtihād
ash-shar‘ī) that we are busy
expounding? We say that there is no connection between this proposition that
calls for a new reading of the Qur’ān- unbounded by the linguistic
principles of Quranic commentary- and ijtihād
proper. This latter cannot be traversed except in the pasture of the text
and under its domain.
We have heard some of them
reply “The role of the text, on the contrary, is to serve maslaḥah (general welfare)- and
the
Our argument, in demonstrating
the fallacy of this position, is as follows: this conception would have been
correct if the following were to apply- if the Sharī‘ah of
Islām was connected to the welfare of human beings, it would have been established
by inducing a text which says, for example, “When in legislating a matter you
are convinced that it contributes to general welfare, then that correctly
becomes Islamic law.”
However, the reality is that
the rulings of Islamic law that concern maṣlaḥah are not
established by such a general and absolute text. On the contrary, all such
rulings are established on a pattern that follows the particulars (juz‘iyāt)
of texts and is connected with diverse applications of rulings- where the
comprehensive whole is determined by the argument of the parts. It represents
outwardly the design of the Lawgiver for the safeguarding of human interests in
this world and the next- in accordance with the demarcated meaning stipulated
for maṣlaḥah and the
proper order stipulated for [choosing between its] kinds.
Since it is well known through
the principles of logic that a whole cannot be established except through its
parts, then the same must apply with respect to the reality of maṣlaḥah
in whatever the matter under consideration- whether it is supported by a
detailed proof from the Sharī‘ah attributable to the texts or that,
which at the very least, removes that which is in contradiction to the
Sharī‘ah. If not, then the evidence garnered from the study of the texts-
which provide the proofs for prescribing
rulings in accordance with maṣlaḥah- would be void. In that
case, the concept of maṣlaḥah itself would be rendered void.
This is since it has the meaning of a whole that is dispersed in the
particulars of rulings indicated by the texts.
This is the meaning of
Shāṭibī’s saying in the Al-Muwāfaqāt: “The consideration of particularities must
be in conjunction with the consideration of generalities, and vice versa. This is unquestionably the
profoundest reflection propounded by the
mujtahidūn. It is here that their labours reach culmination in the
field of ijtihād.”[87]
Imām al-Shāfi‘ī explains this point at
great length in the foremost part of his Al-Risālah.
If among the group [calling to unbounded ijtihād] there are those who
consider such an argument too subtle for their understanding then it would be
more proper for them not to talk about the topic or set the parameters of the
discussion. It is sufficient [when they wish to explore the issue] that they are
bent on understanding the meanings of the terms used and the principles of
research [in this field].
The scope of ijtihād and the ruling regarding
it
A foundational principle is that legal ijtihād is connected to a ruling
that is not based on unambiguous evidence (dalīl
qaṭ‘ī). This is because the need for ijtihād derives from the occurrence of probability with regard
[to the interpretation] of a text or its indications.
Probability does not arise save from evidence that is
speculative (ẓannī). There
are a plethora of reasons for the many, worthy cases of probable
interpretation- as opposed to those where the evidence is unambiguous. The
scholars in the field of the principles of jurisprudence are conversant with
such probabilities through the principles of textual interpretation.
In this way, matters concerning the tenets of the
Islamic faith and its foundational principles derive from firm and certain
evidence where there is no scope for ijtihād.
Equally, all else which Allah has obligated His servants to understand and know
in an unambiguous manner are also derived from such evidence. Examples here
include establishing the five daily prayers, fasting in Ramaḍān,
performing the Ḥajj if one is able to, the forbidding of killing,
adultery and fornication, stealing and drinking alcohol. All of these are
derived from unambiguous evidence that denotes certainty. There is no scope for
probable interpretation in their regard and thus no scope regarding them, or in
what is proven of them, for ijtihād.
One of the greatest favours of Allah to His servants
is that He has provided them with foundational rulings that He has ordered them
to comprehend and know for sure through established proof. Such evidence is
unambiguous in meaning and the rulings pertaining to it derive from the nature
of this evidence- in such a manner that there is no need for one to utilize ijtihād
to reflect upon the matter. The clarity of the proof and the strength of its
unambiguous evidence make it independent of such a need.
Among the clearest evidence that the principal Islamic
beliefs and that which follows in their wake of principal legal rulings
transcend the sphere of ijtihād is the verse : “Know that there is
no god but Allah.” [47:91]. We know that knowledge is that which surpasses
doubt and speculation and attains to certainty and definitiveness. This is not
achieved except through unambiguous proofs that do not require speculation or ijtihād.
Something similar can be found the Word of Allah that
warns against following spurious beliefs: “ “They follow but a guess and a
guess is no substitute for truth.”[53:28]. And in the Word of the Exalted in
blocking such a course of action: “And follow not that of which you have no
knowledge. Indeed, the hearing, the sight and the heart- each of these will be
questioned.”[17:36]
In explaining this Imām al-Shāfi‘ī,
Allah have mercy upon him, says:
Knowledge is of two types. There is universal
knowledge which the bāligh person, as distinct from the non-bāligh
person, cannot be ignorant of. This includes knowledge of the five prayers, the
fasting in Ramaḍān that Allah has obligated upon people, performing
the Ḥajj if they are able to, to pay zakāh from their wealth, and
that He has forbidden them from adultery and fornication, murder, stealing and
drinking alcohol- and whatever is contained in the meanings of these of what
Allah has obligated His servants to do, to know and to give of their lives and
wealth. And that they desist from whatever Allah has forbidden to them. This
whole category of knowledge is found textually in the Book of Allah and it is
universally known by the people of Islam. It is universally transmitted from
the previous universal transmission. It is narrated from the Messenger of Allah
and its narration is not contended nor the fact that it is an obligation for Muslims.
This is universal knowledge which cannot contain the possibility of error in
its transmission nor can it be subject to interpretation. Nor is one permitted
to contend with it.[88]
Imām Ghazālī
says in the Mustaṣfā:
Ijtihad applies to any
legal ruling which is not based on unambiguous evidence. We do not include in
the “legal” the rational domain or issues of dialectical theology. For the truth therein is one and the
conclusion one. Mistakes in this area are sinful. Rather, we mean by the
application of ijtihād is that where a mistake cannot be sinful. As
for the necessity of establishing the five daily prayers, zakāt and
all else that the Ummah agree on are clear from the
This, in essence, is what is
also said by other scholars of Islamic law and its principles. We cannot think
that there will be a difference of opinion concerning this- given its plain
rational and transmitted basis already mentioned and which makes no room for
contention in the matter.
Thus the scope for ijtihād
takes place within the branches of the
As for the ruling regarding ijtihād,
its scope encompasses that in which it is enacted. In short, it is obligatory (wājib),
that is, prior to any question regarding its conditions or assessment of who is
qualified to undertake ijtihād. Then it turns upon that which is an
individual (‘aynī) obligation or a community (kifāyī)
obligation. This in turn must necessarily take into consideration a variety of
other factors. We will clarify these shortly.
[90]The proof of Ijtihād
being obligatory is derived from the following:
1-
All the phrases that clearly prove the imperativeness
of following the Book [the Holy Qur’ān] and the Sunnah, such as
Allah the Exalted saying: “Say: Obey Allah and the Messenger.” [3:21];
or the Exalted saying: “Obey Allah and His Messenger, and do not turn away
from him when you hear him speak.” [8: 20]; or the saying of the Noble
Messenger, Allah’s Peace and Salutations upon him, in what al-Imām Muslim
narrates from: “And, verily, I have left amongst you, something that you
will never go astray after it, if you hold on to it, it is the Book of Allah.”
The employment of Ijtihād
in understanding Allāh’s Book and the Sunnah of His Messenger, the
Salutations and Peace of Allah be upon him, is indicated by the above evidence
in that if Allah, the Exalted, obligates His servants to keep to the
commandments and prohibitions contained in His Book or the Sunnah of His
Messenger, then He has obligated them to intellectually exert themselves in
fathoming what these commands and prohibitions are as they occur in the text. .
This is because the obligation to obey cannot be followed except doing this and
thus it is also obligatory- as established by the rules of Uęńl al-Fiqh.
2- AllŞh’s the Exalted
saying: “The believers should not go forth all together; If a contingent from
every group remains behind, they could devote themselves to studying the
religion, and warn the people when they return to them, so that they may learn
to guard themselves against evil.” [9:22].
The manner of
deducing the proof for the importance of ijtihād] from this verse
is for us to know that JihŞd (fighting the
enemy for the Sake of AllŞh) is of the most
important of what AllŞh has ordained and
made obligatory upon His servants. Thus, if despite this, He has commanded that
a group of people should remain behind so that they may be available for
comprehending the religion- namely, the derivation of rulings from phrases of
the Book and the Sunnah- then this is of the best evidence that Ijtihād
in understanding the rulings of IslŞm is an obligation,
like JihŞd- and perhaps that Ijtihād
is an even more important endeavour.
3- More generally,
[it is also derived] from the activities of the jurists among the ŸaĘŞbah and the
injunctions of RasńlullŞh, the Salutations
and Peace of Allah be upon him, when he
used to send people out to the various cities and regions to teach the laws and
rulings of the religion. There are many aḥadīth that prove
this.
Ijtihād is individually obligated
upon every legally responsible person [mukallaf] if he fulfils the conditions
for undertaking it. There must also be an awareness that it can be divided into
various types:
-IjtihŞd Muđlaq [unrestricted
ijtihād], that is, in relation to all matters and rulings basing
itself upon a set scientific method;
-IjtihŞd ḍaman
madhhab [ijtihād within a madhhab], that is, within
one of the four schools of law and
keeping to a specific Imām’s method in theory and investigation;
-IjtihŞd fī
taḥqīq manāṭ il ḥukm: ijtihād in
determining the grounds of a ruling. This we will elaborate later.
Among the clearest
proofs of the constancy of this individual obligation [for those who fulfil the
criteria for undertaking ijtihād] is the divergent indication in
the Exalted’s saying: “Then, ask the people of remembrance, if you do not
have the knowledge.” [16:42]. Here the expression: “if you do not have
the knowledge.” proves that, if a person is knowledgeable and has the
ability for understanding and deriving the laws, then, it is not befitting for
him to ask anyone; rather, he is duty-bound to research and ponder.
The obligation of ijtihād
becomes a group one when one takes into consideration the generality of Muslims
in all their different conditions and circumstances. In other words, this
obligation is entrusted upon the whole Muslim community in a definite and
continuous manner, whether the conditions of IjtihŞd are fulfilled by
some people of the district or whether none there can undertake it. In this latter circumstance, they must strive
their utmost in developing learned scholars amongst them who can apply Allah’s
laws in areas where ijtihŞd needs to be
exercised.
However, the
question rises: Does it suffice to follow the A’imma mujtahidūn
when these latter have passed away- thus lifting the burden of this obligation?
Or is there a necessity to promote one from amongst them who is capable of
learning, thereby advancing to the level of ijtihŞd- so that they are
exempt from following those who have already passed away?
The correct
position is that of the majority of scholars- namely, the permissibility of
following [taqlīd] a mujtahid, even if he has passed away;
for indeed correct opinions and judgments do not die with the death of those
who issued them. Ibn Al-Qayyim says:
Is it allowed for
the one living to imitate the one who has passed away, and act according to his
rulings, without considering the proof for the ruling? The companions of Al-ImŞm AĘmad (ibn Ťanbal) hold two
views regarding this. Those who prohibit it argue that the mujtahid could have changed his opinion if he was alive for he
would have pondered anew at the occurrence of this event. The second view
permits it and is adopted by followers [muqallidīn] in all four
corners of the world. The preferred view is what they do in following those who have passed away.
Furthermore, opinions do not die out like those who held them- just like the
information does not die out with the death of informants.[91]
Furthermore,
Al-DahlawĚ says in his book, Ťujjah AllŞh al-BŞlighah:
Regarding the four
written, recorded schools of law- indeed, the ummah- or those who are
considered to be of the ummah-
have reached consensus on the permissibility of following the schools of law up
to the present day. The benefits of
following these schools are clear, particularly in these days when there is a
dearth of solicitude, when every soul has been made to drink its desires, and
when everyone who has an opinion is taken with it.”[92]
Following this, the
existence of the of recorded judgments of the A’immah mujtahidūn who
have passed on, lifts the burden of ijtihŞd as a group
obligation among Muslims in relation to those matters whose rulings are
mentioned in such writings- if there is no one among them who is able to
exercise ijtihŞd, even if it be in
one case (mas’alah). However, if
there is amongst them one who is capable of exercising ijtihŞd then it is
prohibited for such a one to follow others, whether alive or dead. He is
obliged to reflect and exercise ijtihŞd. As for the muqallidūn
and the masses in general they may choose between following the mujtahidūn
who are alive among them or continue to follow those jurists who have passed
on.
As for the urgent
matters and problems that are present in this era, exercising ijtihŞd in determining
rulings is a group obligation among Muslim, whatever their conditions and
circumstances might be. Thus if there is none among them who devotes themselves
to studying Islamic Law in order to be able to ultimately exercise ijtihād
in determining these rulings then all the Muslims have sinned and earned the
punishment of AllŞh, the Exalted.
This is the condition perhaps that concerns those A’immah who hold the
view that no era should be free of one capable of exercising ijtihād with
regards to AllŞh’s Book and the Sunnah
of His Messenger, the Salutations and Peace of Allah be upon him. This is
because in every era new problems, customs and situations arise and therefore
there must be learned scholars who exercise ijtihād in confronting
these issues and determining their rulings.
IjtihŞd as a legal proof
and its religious authority
Ii is clear from
what we have discussed that exercising ijtihŞd in fiqh is
compulsory generally- in accordance with our synopsis as indicated above. Thus
it consequently follows that its clear result is also compulsory. Indeed, a
ruling based on ijtihād becomes a binding proof and forms part of
religious rulings- rulings that must be adhered to. Disregarding it is
prohibited. If ijtihŞd is a religious
obligation then whatever it leads to necessarily becomes a religious ruling.
At this juncture there is a
mistake- indeed a danger-which many contemporary researchers in this area fall
into due to their making a distinction between what they term as al-Sharī‘ah
al-Islāmī [Islamic Law] and Aḥkām al-Fiqhīyyah
al-Ijtihādī [legal rulings based on ijtihād]. They
restrict the ambit of religion and what falls under its authority to what they
call
The reality is that
this agitated call to ijtihād and for a re-look at legal rulings (al-Aḥkām
al-Fiqhīyyah) from the ardent admirers of Western civilisation is the
natural fruit of this dangerous misconception.
Such imagine that
nothing compels them to submit to rulings, which are firmly established through
ijtihād by past scholars. They
do not view these rulings as part of the religion sent down from AllŞh: rather, they
view them as skilled scholarly reflections and considered opinions. Such
opinions can be abrogated by the views of later scholars, particularly in the
light of changing circumstances. It is the belittling of the underlying
religious value of legal rulings based on ijtihād
that goad the above-mentioned admirers to call to what they term as the renewal
of Islamic jurisprudence through a new ijtihŞd method!
Furthermore, if we
cogitate upon this conception-this fictitious distinction between al-Sharī‘ah al-Islāmī and
al-Aḥkām al-Fiqhīyyah
al-Ijtihādī- then we will certainly discover that our submission
to what is termed al-Sharī‘ah
al-Islāmī constitutes an
illusory submission, a slogan without content .
This is since the
major portion of the rulings in the
Many times have we
read or listened to people praising the
And thus one of us
want to rightfully ask: What then is the meaning of an everlasting and
sanctified
To get back to our
earlier point, we confirm that rulings resulting from ijtihād- when its principles have been followed and its conditions
fulfilled- is very much part of, and not
detached from, the requirements of religion. It is firstly a ruling that is
obligatory on the mujtahid himself
and, secondly, upon all those who have not reached the grade of being able to
exercise ijtihād.
If there is one ijtihŞd concerning a particular matter, the non-mujtahid
is obliged to follow the ruling. However, if there are different
ijtihād rulings on a matter he may follow that to which he inclines and
finds acceptable. The religious ḥukm here is that he chooses a new
one but stays within the ambit of the mujtahidīn.
This is proven by
the fact that AllŞh, the Exalted,
says: “Then enquire from the people of remembrance if you do not have the
knowledge.” (Quran 16: 43). Being
commanded to ask the people of remembrance- who are the scholars-
implies a command to follow them. And is religion other that what AllŞh I has commanded His
servants to do, and to submit to that command?
It is also proven
by a position scholars have agreed upon, namely, that a later IjtihŞd does not undo a
previous ijtihŞd on the same issue.
Al-AsnawĚ says in his
commentary on the MinhŞj Al-Bay»ŞwĚ: “It is agreed that one ijtihŞd does not undo another.”[93] The
author of Musallim al-Thubńt writes: “A ḥukm
ijtihādī is not cancelled if it is not in conflict with a definitive
ruling. If not, a succeeding ḥukm ijtihādī may cancel it.”[94]
It is well-known
that `Umar Ibn Al-KhađđŞb, Allah be pleased
with him, once gave a fatwā in
the matter of shares that excluded sharing between uterine and consanguine
brothers and sisters. Then he gave another fatwā where such sharing was
permitted. When asked about this, he replied: “That was a decree of ours, and this is a decree of ours.”
The reason for ijtihŞd (where conditions
for its exercise are fulfilled) not being undone is that it operates at the
same level as the textual evidence for a ruling. Just as following the textual
evidence is a religious obligation, so is following the outcome of ijtihād obligated upon the mujtahid and the one who follows
him. Thus if arrives at another ijtihŞd in exactly the
same issue- one that he gives preference to even if it is in opposition to what
he had previously opined- then that is like the appearance of a text that is in
conflict to one that had become before it: the succeeding text abrogates the
one prior to it as well as this latter’s enforceability. However, the
occurrence of the succeeding text does not imply that the previous one was
erroneous or false fundamentally. In this way, the later ijtihŞd has no authority
in the period when the earlier one
held sway, since this latter is a continuation of a religious ḥukm. The authority of this later ijtihād operates in the later
period in which it was founded and it does so only through abrogation and by
terminating (the enforceability) of the previous ijtihād.
This is the reason
why it is valid for to pray in any direction Qiblah is believed to probably be [when it cannot be ascertained
for certain]- since the command of AllŞh, the Exalted,
cannot be followed except by doing this. And we know that AllŞh, the Exalted,
does not burden a soul with more than it can bear. Indeed, each direction, even
though they cannot all be the true Qiblah
at the same time, becomes the Qiblah
that AllŞh, the Exalted,
commands the one who prays to face. Therefore, therefore the mujtahid [who ascertains the
probability of the Qiblah] and the muqallid [who must follow him] are
obliged to pray in the direction chosen.
However, those who
belittle rulings based on ijtihād
and negate its religious authority might advance the following objections, to
which we will reply.
Firstly- It may be
objected that religious authority in any matter must be based on certainty- and
certainty is based on unequivocal proofs whereas rulings based on ijtihŞd always rely on
probable evidence. So how can unequivocal rulings, which are the basis of the
religious authority, derive from probable conceptions?
We reply to this
objection as follows: the well-established religious authority that is
associated with ijtihād follows
from the confirmed legal rule that acting upon rulings based on ijtihād is an obligation upon the mujtahidūn and the muqallidūn and there is no getting
pass this. It does not follow from the nature of the probable evidence upon
which such rulings are based. These two issues are separate.
Further, while the
evidence for a particular position may be probable the obligation to act
according to it might be confirmed by unequivocal proof [dalīl qat‘ī]. Indeed, among the best examples of such is
the evidence of the solitary narration [khabar
ul wāḥid] in the field of
applied rulings [al-aḥkām
al-‘amalīyyah]. Indeed the meaning of these narrations is that they
constitute, for the major part, probable evidence[95]-
except that correct proofs have come down to us through mutawātir transmission on the obligation to act according to
these reports. Example include the many
aḥadīth concerning the Prophet, the Salutations and Peace of
Allah be upon him, sending individual Companions (AllŞh, the Exalted, is
pleased with all of them) to many different places to teach people the rules of
the religion. It is as if the Prophet, the Salutations and Peace of Allah be
upon him, is telling these people: if you suppose that these Companions are
truthful in what they explain to you concerning the permitted and the
prohibited, then you are required to act according to that supposition.[96]
It is then correct
for us that the evidence of the solitary narration, even though it does
progress beyond the probable in itself, does become certain and unequivocal as
evidence of an act that has been obligated because of it. And the position on rulings based on ijtihād is the same as that on the
solitary narration, there being no distinction between the two in this
regard.
A second objection
may be posed: giving rulings based on IjtihŞd religious
authority veers towards the opinion of the al-Muîawwibah, who opine that the truth in any particular
matter is multiple, and that all mujtahidūn
have attained to the truth. However, the preponderant view is that in the
knowledge and decree of Allah, the Exalted, truth is one and that the mujtahidūn may or may not attain
this. Thus they may correct or incorrect, in conformity with a ṣaḥīḥ narration
from the Messenger, the Salutations and Peace of Allah be upon him.
Our answer to this
objection is that this is a different matter altogether, one that we are not
dealing with here. The oneness or multiple nature of truth in the knowledge of
AllŞh, the Exalted, is
one thing, and AllŞh necessitating His
servants to follow the most likely probability in applied rulings is another.
There is no reason to connect these two issues.
For indeed the Qiblah that AllŞh, the Exalted, has
commanded His servants to face during their prayer is one in reality of issue
and origin. However, AllŞh, the Exalted,
does not obligate those servants of His who are not privileged to see the Ka`bah,
or who are not certain of its direction, any more than facing what they think
is its most likely direction., And even if their thinking in this regard
changes during prayer, it requires that they turn in every raka`ah (unit
of prayer) from one direction to another!
[97]The Prophet, the Salutations and Peace of
Allah be upon him, commanded people, when the moon was difficult to be sight,
to complete the month of Sha‘bān in thirty days, despite the fact that we know for certain (yaqīnan)that what makes fasting
compulsory is the inception of the month of Ramadan. There is no doubt that the
proof for completing the month of Sha‘bān in thirty days is a
speculative (ẓannī) one,
with a possibility that it could possibly be twenty nine days. Allah has not
burdened human beings with that they cannot bear, nor does he command them to
disclose the truth that exists in the divine knowledge of Allah. Then He
reveals the truth through their Ijtihād for the guidance that they
ought- this being a great blessing from Allah. This Ijtihād becomes
part of their religion which they are obligated to follow.
This is [the answer to the objection] if we take the
position that the truth is one, and that the Mujtahid may either be
correct or incorrect. And if we incline towards the position of the Muṣṣawibah- which is the
position of Imām
Ghazālī, Imām
Bāqilānī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn
and others- the issue would not even arise.
A third objection [is as follows]: Perhaps one may
find that those who hold the opinion that the establishment of religious
authority through Ijtihād clashes with that which is narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim when the Prophet, the Salutations
and Peace of Allah be upon him, sent a Companion as the head of a mission and
told him: “ If the people of Ḥaṣan accept your judgment, do not say
that it is the judgment of Allah, because you are do not know you whether you
are in agreement with the verdict of Allah or not. Rather, convince them to accept your
judgment.”
In respond to this claim the ‘Ulamā’ says:
1. Examples of these judicial matters fall under the ḥukm
of Imāmah[98]
[pertaining to his verdict in relation to peace and war]. As we are aware the
Imām is permitted by Allah to choose the response that in his view best
serves the interests of Muslims in matters pertaining to Hulul
[permissible matters] and Ahkām [judicial matters]. This is known
as the Aḥkām al Imām [Judicial rulings of the Imām]
or Islamic politics [al-Siyāsah
al-Shar‘īyyah].
In view of this, it is possible that the judgment
chosen by the Imām could possibly not be the most appropriate at that
time. An example of the choice that an Imām may have to make is when the
the Prophet, the Salutations and Peace of Allah be upon him, after the battle
of Badr, chose
that the prisoners of war, should pay a ransom for their freedom rather than being killed. Therefore one of
the requirements of respect towards Allah is that the Imām should ascribe
his considered opinion to himself and not claim that it is from Allah bearing
in mind the probability that it can be wrong.
Despite this, people should not be given the option as
to whether they would want to follow the Imām, but instead they
should be compelled to obey him as it is a command from Allah when he says: “
Oh you who believe obey Allah and obey his messengers and those who are in
authority over you. ”[4:29]
The Imām has exerted himself in his Ijtihād
and therefore he commands them to accept it on the bases of what he feels is
beneficial and in the best interest of the Muslims. If he does not command this
from them he would be in direct violation of disobeying Allah. If he has
commanded them to follow his verdict, and they refuse to accept it, they would
be disobeying Allah. Sufficient is this as proof that the Ijtihād of
the Imām is considered as a legal religious verdict binding upon
him and others to follow.
2. With regards to all legal matters based on Ijtihād
it is important for the mujtahid after he has exerted himself in his Ijtihad
to ascribe to his understanding to himself, as a mark of respect towards Allah-
and his Ijtihad- since it might be incorrect.
This does not excuse him from following his Ijtihad
as it is necessary for the one who passes a Fatwah to follow his own Fatwah.
All that which has been discussed relates to proper
respect with Allah. This is since the Prophet, the Salutations and Peace of
Allah be upon him, reminds us that when we seek clarity on a matter through Ijtihād
there arises a possibility of it being correct.
This above clearly explains the religious authority of Aḥkām derived through the exercise of Ijtihād.
There is however sophistry employed by certain people,
explained previously, who cannot comprehend this process. They try to persuade
others to disregard and abrogate it with a similar form of Ijtihād,
believing that this cannot be incorporated in the judicial process under the
I have read one of them who calls for a review of all
this and which he terms Al
Turāth al fiqhī (legal legacy) in accordance with his own
terminology and with intense pride despite himself. When Fiqh al Islāmi
becomes known as Turāth and its true value is reflected under this
understanding, then this group’s pride must be seen as silly and laughable. For
what then is intended by the Shar’iah of Islam? And what then is intended by describing the
Ijtihad has a number of divisions:
It is divided with respect to the understanding of the
Manāṭ al Hukm [the grounds of the verdict] into what is known
as Ijtihād fī Tahqīq al Manāt [effecting of the
grounds], Takhhrīj al Manāt
[the establishment of the grounds]and Tanqiḥ al Manāt [the
examination of the grounds].
It is further divided with respect to the Aḥkām
of the Sharī‘ah into Ijtihād into a specified part of
the Sharī‘ah and Ijtihād that encompasses all tenets
and branches of the
It is also divided with regards to the Mujtahid
(the one who exercises ijtihād) into what is known as Ijtihād
Mutlaq (unrestricted ijtihād) and Ijtihād fil Madhhab (ijtihād within a madhhab).
We will elaborate each of its division starting from
the simplest and end at what appears to be the most complicated. We will also
try to explain what is incumbent upon each Muslim with regards to the various
divisions of Ijtihād.
First we will discuss the Ijtihād with the
regards to Manāṭ Ḥukm. This is further divided into
various divisions, the first being the easiest and least complicated, known as Tahqīq
al Manāt (effecting of the grounds). What is meant here is to apply
the various Aḥkām of the
This application and implementation requires some
knowledge and insight which will result in strengthening the Ijtihād
even though the individual appears to be ignorant on matters pertaining to the
fundamentals of the Sharī‘ah and its sources. This is since such
ijtihād does not represent anything more than the application of received
textual rulings in society.
There is no dispute amongst the ‘ulamā’
that this category is wājib upon all who all considered to be Mukallaf
[possessing legal capacity] and no one will be exempted from it until the
Day of Judgment. This opinion is registered by Imām
Shāṭibī in his Muwāfaqāt and also by Imām
Ghazālī in his Mustaṣfā.[99]
An example of this category is when Allah says: “ Let
those who possesses trustworthiness and justice (‘adālah) bear
witness ”. In this verse Allah explains
that the grounds of bearing witness is that the individual be trustworthy and
just. The
Another example is when Allah has made the poor and
needy worthy recipients of Zakāh. We understand the literal and
legal definition of faqīr, but what remains is to apply it to
individuals in order to determine whether this criterion is met- these
individuals being the object of the ruling. This determination is an obligation
for the mukallifūn themselves.
Another example is the prohibition of consuming that
which harms the body and the mind. What remains is for us to establish,
identify and specify all that which is considered to be harmful in order to
effect the decree of prohibition. This knowledge and prohibition is compulsory
upon all. If what is harmful is minimal or ambiguous it is necessary to seek
advice from experts and specialists, like doctors. Examples include specifying
the direction of the Qiblah at the time of ṣalāh,
specifying products connected to usury, to have knowledge of the cleanliness of
the place of Ṣalah and of the water to be used for wudū‘.
All of that which has been discussed previously
requires Ijtihād but an Ijtihād that does not require
any legal expertise-like the person who has knowledge of the various
directions, and some idea of the direction of the Qiblah, and the person
who is able to identify products engaging in usury, and the one who is able to identify the area
effected by najāsah (filth) and also being able to determine what
water to use for the purpose of wudū’.
There are certain principles that make this type of Ijtihad
easy, like the following general rules: “ Purity is the original state of all
things ”, “ The origin of all things is
that it will remain as it was previously ” and “ Future doubt will not replace
previous certainty ”.
This form of Ijtihad is known as Tahqīq
al Manāṭ or Manāt al Aḥ̣kām. It
forms the widest area for ijtihād and the ruling with regard to it
in that none of the mukallifūn
is exempted from this ruling until the Day of Judgment .
The second and third division of Ijtihād
is Takhrīj Manāṭ al Hukm and Tanqīḥ Manāṭ al
Ḥukm. Ijtihād fī Takhrīj Manāṭ al Hukm
is to exert one’s effort to extract and manifest the ‘illah (effective
cause) of the shar‘ī verdict. An example would be extracting the
reasons why certain things and not others fall under the prohibition of usury. Ijtihād
fī Tanqīḥ Manāṭ al Ḥukm.is to put aside
all that which is unduly attached to the common ‘Illah without really
being part of it.
Undoubtedly these two division of Ijtihād
are subject to specific conditions which are described in detail by the ‘Ulamā’.
Both of these divisions fall under the discussion concerning Qiyās
(analogy). This is considered to be the most complicated type of Ijtihad.
Ijtihad with regards to its Tajza’u wa ‘Adimihi [partitioning or the lack thereof]
What is meant here is that the Mujtahid either
possesses general knowledge of all matters and is able to apply his Ijtihād
in matters pertaining to all questions that arise (masā’il) and also all areas of the Aḥkām
of Fiqh or he possesses specialized knowledge in specified and
selected areas of certain Masā’il and not in others. He thus
attains a level of Ijtihād only in that which he has studied and is
not able apply Ijtihād in the various other fields of Shari’ah.
To briefly explain this, we mention the quotation of
the author of the book Kashf al Asrār with regard to this issue. He says after a lengthy discussion explaining the
requirements of a mujtahid; “ Know that the amalgamation of these various sciences is the pre-condition
for one described as a mujtahid
mutlaq- one who is able to express his fatwah (legal opinion) in all
areas of the Aḥkām of the Sharī‘ah- and such
general ijtihād is unrestricted.
But it is permitted for a scholar to
have limited authority of Ijtihād in certain areas of the Ahkām
and not others ”. Imam Ghazali
makes mention of this at the end of his explanation of the conditions
and prerequisites of a Mujtahid and this is likewise done by Imam
ibn al Ḥājib in his book “ Mukhtasar ”.
We can thus see from the above that the conditions
mentioned for Ijtihād by the ‘Ulamā’ is directly
connected to the issues that a researcher wishes to study. This is because
knowledge is not necessarily a whole that cannot be partitioned. Thus knowledge
pertaining to a specific issue is not necessarily attached to another one.
Undoubtedly the one that possesses general knowledge
(of sharī‘ah) and seeks to implement it in Ijtihād must
fulfil the prerequisites of Ijtihad, whether his Ijtihad is only
in selected issue or
encompasses all issues.
Any researcher in a Fiqh issue must before
anything possess a comprehensive understanding of Fiqh itself. In
addition, he must possess specific and principled knowledge pertaining to the
specific issue (of ijtihād).
What is not meant by division is the possibility for
one to apply his Ijtihād in a
specific issue and at
the same time be rendered incompetent in applying his Ijtihād in another issue. Indeed such a comparison can
by no means be found.
Ijtihād with regards to Iṭlāq (
unrestrictedness)or following the discipline of one of the Madhāhib.
Ijtihād with regards to this third division is divided into
what is known as Ijtihādan Mutlaqan (unrestricted Ijtihād)
and Ijtihād in one of the respected Madhāhib.
Al Ijtihād al Mutlaq (unrestricted Ijtihād) refers to when the
researcher depends on his personally acquired knowledge to extract the
principles of Ijtīhad and is able to use the various methods of
looking at the decisive proofs. He bases his ruling on that which he views as
the correct principles and procedures of textual exegesis ( Qur’an and Sunnah)-
such as the issues of ‘Umūm (general), Khusūs(specific),
Itlāq(unrestricted), Taqyīd( restricted), Dalā’il
al Amr wa Nahy) (indicators of command and prohibition), Ḥaqiqah
(literal interpretation), Majāz( metaphorical interpretation), etc.
In addition to this he would need to possess a vast knowledge of the science of
the Qur’an and the Sunnah, knowledge of the various aḥkām
of jurisprudence and also the general principles of Fiqh.
The ‘Ulama’ of the respected four schools of
thought have made this to be the criterion for one who desires to practice the
noble concept of Ijtihād.
Secondly: The mujtahid (in a madhhab) takes one
madhhab and binds himself exactly to the school’s methodology and then builds
on his own Ijtihād. He is considered to be Mujtahid, but
duly follows the methods and procedures of one of the four Imams. It is
for this reason he is known as a Mujtahid in a specific Madhhab.
It is a known fact that the various methodologies of
looking at the decisive proofs of the texts (Qur’an and Sunnah)
and the most important methods used to extract these proofs have been set at
the end of the second and at the beginning of the of third century (hijrī)
-which witnessed an era of both consensus (amongst the ‘Ulama’)and the
beginning of disputes. When great ‘Ulamā’ appeared in the fourth
century and those after them, it witnessed the beginning of disputes between
the various Madhāhib. They started adopting their methodology of Ijtihād without really following
the teachings of that Madhhab when looking at a Furū’(branch)
of the Ahkām. They depended on their methods of Ijtihād in each Fatwa without really abandoning the
principles and criterion of Ijtihād that was set previously. This
has led to a totally new picture when looking at the Aḥkām
without undermining the concept of Ijtihād. They did not develop a
new methodology of Ijtihād nor abandoned it, therefore this kind of
ijtihād is known as Al Ijtihād fil Madhhab.
This process of Ijtihad continued for a long
time, witnessing the developing of ‘Ulamā’ in each century,
reaching a high grade in Ijtihād and also sinking to its lowest. Without a
doubt these few centuries witnessed great and unique ‘Ulama’ in Ijtihad,
like that of al-Qaffāl al Shāshi, Al ‘Izz bin ‘Abd al Salām,
Imām Ghazāli, Imām Ṭahawi, Ibn ‘Arabī, Ibn Daqīq
al ‘Īd, etc.
Besides these ‘Ulama’ there are a number of
other great Ulama who obtained the grade of Ijtihād through their
knowledge but were not recognized amongst the great Mujtahidūn.
Their Ijtihād was based upon the principles and bases of their
predecessors whose Madhāhib became well known.
There has been a discussion which has been clouding
certain ‘ulamā and
manifests itself from one century to the other- a discussion which seems not to go way and a
noise that does not want to subside. The talking point is: Was the door of Ijtihad closed at the end of the third century? Why
has it been closed? Who is responsible for closing its doors? Has our history
become stagnant ever since the doors of Ijtihād were shut, being
unable to produce unique ‘Ulamā’ like Imām Abū
Ḥanīfah, Imām Mālik and Imām Shāfi’ī?
Whoever says the doors of Ijtihād have been
closed means that there has been no Ijtihād ever since the fourth century,
and all that the fuqhahā busied themselves with was selecting the
appropriate Qawl (opinion of the Four A’immah). Whoever says that
the doors of Ijtihād are not closed and no one possessors the authority to
shut it means that the importance of it has been minimized and that its
understanding and importance has been minimized since no one is exercising it.
During each century there were great scholars who possessed the
requisite knowledge but fear overcame them so that their courage and self
confidence waned and thus they they did not plunge as directly into the field (of
ijtihād) as those before them.
This same argument is recast, in a severer manner, as
a pressing reality of our time. Our contemporary situation differs with respect
to the previous centuries, which requires an urgent response. This situation in
which we find ourselves requires great ‘Ulama’ who will revive the
spirit of Ijtihād and move away from following those before them,
especially when we are faced with new challenges.
What are the realities of Ijihad today? What is
the position of Muslims with regard to Ijtihad today?
Firstly, allow me to say what has been said by one of
the contemporary scholars, namely, that it appears that the dispute as to whether
the door or Ijtihād is open or closed is a futile discussion which
will accomplish nothing. There is no positives or negatives in ascertaining
whether it is open or closed. Each opinion has a large degree of truth in how
they view this issue.
Whosoever says that the doors of Ijtihād
has been officially closed at the beginning of the fourth century means that
the fundamental principles of Ijtihād and the methodology of
looking at proofs has been completed. And whosoever says that the doors of Ijtihād
is not closed and will remain open, means that there is a continuous
application of its fundamentals principles in extracting the Aḥkām
from its sources in order to exercise Ijtihad on new questions.
With regards to this issue, there is something very
important and necessary for us to explain and which has been absent in much of
the discussion. Some believe that the reason why the door of Ijtihād
has been closed is due to the lack of knowledge and insight of the ‘Ulamā’
to exercise Ijtihad and to understanding their role in the times that
they are living in. There is no doubt that if this is correct it would be a
strange phenomenon and will have an adverse effect on people. Perhaps some
scholars have presented a reasonable excuse by describing those ‘Ulamā’
who appeared after that golden centuries as being weak and rigid, preferring to
imitate those before them. Whatever the reason we believe it to be incorrect.
[100]An important entry point in
explaining this reality is to recall what we have previously explained at the
beginning of this essay, namely that ijtihād in the Islamic sharī ̀ah is not a free entity of
creativity, as we may know it in the sphere of many other research topics
related to human sciences and disciplines. It is rather following a clearly illustrated
direction and a commitment to a defined methodology, because it is the search
for the ruling of Allāh which He addresses to His servants and commands
them with it, either in His Book (i.e. the Qurān) or via His unread
revelation [i.e. the authentic sunnah] to His Prophet Muḥammad,
the Salutations and Peace of Allah be upon him. All of this rests upon clearly
defined scientific means, and there is no scope for anyone, regardless of who
he is, to overstep it or to free himself from it.
So the field of ijtihād which lies before
researchers in the Islamic sharī
̀ah, is clearly defined within the boundaries of specific and
consistent rules, relating to the process of interpreting Arabic texts, and the
avenues of reasoning and analogy, etc. The clear objective of ijtihād
is, reaching the knowledge of the commandments of Allāh and His
prohibitions, all of which concern His servants.
It was in the good fortune of the ‘ulamā’ who
came after the first three centuries, those who have been accused of backwardness
and rigidity, or maybe it was not such a good fortune for them, that they paid
attention to and looked at (the ijtihād of) those before them,
thereby extrapolating the principles of ijtihād and the rules of
extracting the meanings from the texts (i.e. from the Qurān and the
Sunnah). They agreed on that which had no scope for a difference of
opinion pertaining to those rules and principles, and they all shared and
voiced their opinions in everything in which there was room for differences of
opinion! Then these later scholars contemplated over the details of the legal
rulings and concluded that, no school of thought with regards to ijtihād,
reaches an understanding of a particular text or an extraction of a ruling,
except that it would be preceded by a similar view of one of those previous
early scholars!
And so they realized that the plains of ijtihād
in front of them are taken by the ijtihād of those before them,
not because those previous scholars had more depth and knowledge, but because
the plains, as I have mentioned, are limited and the possibilities and angles
of understanding the texts or the rulings are also confined and finite. And all
those possibilities have been dealt with by previous ijtihād.
So with what capability or flexibility in ijtihād
are these people equipped, in creating new ijtihād on a particular
issue, which has been preceded in ijtihād therein? With which legal
means in ijtihād would they reach an invention of new rules and
methods for ijtihād and understanding of texts which people did not
think of before? How is this possible for them if all the possibilities have
preceded and have been closed off or treated by previous ijtihād?
Let us give an example which will bring this reality
closer to our minds:
If I decide now, with all enthusiasm and vigor, to
exercise ijtihād – independently- in the principles of the Islamic Sharī ̀ah, like those have done in the
first three centuries… let’s say I chose a particular topic with regards to the
principles of ijtihād, for example the unspecified expression (al-lafẓ
al ̀ām) in the Arabic language, does it indicate inclusiveness in
its meaning in an absolutely certain way which does not leave any room for
searching or speculation? Or does it indicate its meaning in a speculative way
which leaves it open for debate and research?
And after having exerted myself in study and research,
the proofs that I have gathered make me feel certain that the unspecified
expression indicates its inclusive content in a speculative way. Just as I am
about to express my joy because I have exerted myself in one of the rules of
the interpreting of texts and I’ve extracted a view which I can ascribe to
myself, I am surprised to discover that I have been preceded and so have many
others like me, by the scholars that emerged after the first three centuries
who had this same ijtihād and extraction!
And if I were to change my opinion to the opposite
view that states that the unspecified expression indicates its inclusive
content in an absolutely certain way, I will find out that others have preceded
me and many others like me with the same view!
It is clear that the logical division does not accept
anything else above these two possibilities on the aforementioned issue. So out
of necessity I will find myself, regardless of my competence in knowledge, in a
position where I will follow one of these two views because of my delay in
existence with regards to time. You may, from this example, draw an analogy on
all other academic issues and all other types of rulings related to ijtihād,
whether they are that which are related to the rules and principles of
understanding and extraction [of laws], or that which are scattered in the
rulings of the legal corpus.
From this we know that there is something else besides
the academic excellence that played an important role in elevating those a’immah
who at the start of the history of Islamic legislation, to a position of
central precedence in the plains of ijtihād, and that is: the void
of the sphere of ijtihād in front of them. This made, that whatever
academic achievement they had, it would take its creative shape.
When Imām Al-Shāfi ̀ī came along,
there was no-one who preceded him in extracting the rules of the principles of ijtihād,
and the criteria for reasoning in the validity of rulings. So it was natural
for him, with his academic excellence and his comprehensive understanding of
the Arabic sciences, to extract those rules and to document it according to his
ijtihād and what he saw.
But when other scholars appeared alongside him or
after him, it was only natural for them, in turn, to investigate those
extracted rules and to explore their views regarding it. So they agreed with
him in most of what he said and differed with him or some of them differed with
some of the things that he said. These rules then continued to be placed under
the microscope of research and scrutiny until all other possibilities were
explored and given an opinion upon with various possible views emerging and
ascribed to those who initiated them. So those who came after them, based on
the limited logical possibilities, had no other role to play beside selection,
preference, implementation and development.
Let us suppose that Al-Shāfi ̀ī himself was not born except at a time when the
rules of extraction and the principles of reasoning had been completely
formulated, in the manner that we described, what use would his understanding
and his academic excellence have in the sphere of creativity and absolute ijtihād?
Would he then had any other role to play, even with his grand status, beside
someone who follows and supports the views of those who preceded him, whether
he liked it or not?
This would surely be the case unless we imagine that
he could violate the sources of the sharī ̀ah and the major Arabic
dictums, or if he could cunningly overstep them. It is only then, that he would
be able to come up with something creative and new. But, Allāh forbid,
that any true Muslim would dare to follow this path.
Let us then suppose, in contrast to the above, that
one of the later scholars such as al-Ghazālī, al-Nawawī, al-
̀Izz bin ̀Abd al-Salām,
al-Shāṭibī and their likes, lived in the midst of the second
and third centuries, where the plains of ijtihād are open to them,
we would have seen the historical accounts of his exercise of ijtihād
and his academic creativity. We would have been astonished with his
accomplishments in ijtihād which would not be any less than the ijtihād
exercised by the actual scholars of that particular time.
So what we can clearly see is the fact that those who
preceded made those who came afterward look like followers and imitators,
whether they like it or not, even though in reality they may be independent in
their views and research.
Al-Zarkashi reports from al-Qaffāl al-Shāshi,
a fourth century scholar, that whenever a legal opinion was asked from him, he
would answer the questioner by saying: “ I do not follow al-Shāfi
̀ī but my opinion is in agreement with his opinion!”
Ibn Daqīq al- ̀Īd and al- ̀Izz bin ̀Abd al-Salām, (both seventh
century scholars) also used to abstain from imitation, and they used to
exercise their ijtihād when asked a question, but they would never
go outside the parameters of the madhhab of their Imām.
This is the (correct) way in bringing about harmony
between what these scholars and others like them have said with regard to ijtihād,
and that which is clear from their views and opinions pertaining to conforming
to the views of those before them. So conforming would mean, as al-Qaffāl
has said about himself, agreement in opinion and not imitating. And this was
apparent in their academic activities which reflect the phenomenon of confining
to the methodology of those who preceded them which they could not escape or do
without, for the reason that we have extensively expounded on and explained.[101]
So after having said this, what do we take from this
entire discussion for our contemporary times that we find ourselves in?
Firstly, what we have said about those a’immah (the
ones who came about later) who found themselves in the condition that they were
in, and the causes that were out of their reach which did not allow them to
exercise absolute ijtihād, is exactly what we are able to say about
the scholars of the sharī
̀ah today. In fact they are more in a position to submit to the
conditions and causes that were experienced by those previous scholars.
This is of course unless we suggest that the objective
of the scholars of this era is to roam around freely with their thoughts, free
from any rules of ijtihād and its restrictions which are well known
and clearly laid out, thereby following their own whims which the proponents of
this kind of ijtihād often call ‘The free Islamic spirit’. So this
will afford them, in fact any person for that matter, the position to exercise ijtihād
absolutely in this condition and to come forth with something new that no one
before has set the precedent!
We ask Allāh the Almighty to save us from
this kind of vanity. And we implore Him [to save us] from that which is
certainly the most serious crime that may be perpetrated against Allāh
the Almighty, and that is the perpetration of plotting against Islām
by using its own weaponry and principles!
The rules of the Arabic language are not more sacred
and consistent than the foundations, rules and principles of Islām.
So do the propagators of this ijtihād imply that the contemporary
scholars of the Arabic language may exercise absolute ijtihād in
the grammar, morphology and rules of this language, thereby abrogating the
previous rules which have a long standing tradition of ijtihād by
previous scholars who discovered the rules of Arabic, founded and documented
it, with that which is simply new and progressive and free from any
restrictions of the past and its rigidity?
Could they decide for example to place the doer of an
action in the accusative case rather than the nominative? Can they institute
new rules pertaining to declension or its opposite? Or can they simplify the
precise but complicated rules of the number system? [Can all of this be done]
on the premise that our times- the era of industry- necessitates this?!
What is strange is that those calling for [unbridled] ijitihād
and those who describe the scholars since the fifth Islamic century until today
as being rigid, lazy and lethargic do not taint the scholars of the Arabic
language with these descriptions. In fact they do not even call upon them to
exercise any ijtihād, neither in an absolute way nor in a partial
way within a particular school of thought, even though the rigidity has
overcome them just as much as the other scholars in other disciplines.
This is because they realize that those who exercised ijtihād
relating to the Arabic language at the beginning of Islām, indeed
discovered and then documented these rules of the language. They did not
innovate anything from their imagination. So it was necessary for the scholars
who came later to preserve these discovered realities and not to erase them or
to destroy them with new innovative imaginary views.
But why don’t they realise that the issue regarding
the principles of the Islamic sharī̀ah and its rulings are
exactly like those of the Arabic language? Why don’t they realize this?!
It is indeed very easy for them, if they wanted, to
perceive that changing the rulings of the sharī ̀ah or playing around with it, is
much more dangerous than playing around with the rules of the Arabic language
or to change some of it. Because the rules of the Arabic language, no matter
how much it is necessary for it to remain or to be preserved, it is still only
a terminology that man through his own choice has laid down. As for the rulings
of Islām and the principles of the sharī ̀ah, these have been sent down upon
mankind from Allāh the Most High, via the seal of His Prophets and Messengers,
Muḥammad, the Salutations and Peace of Allah be upon him.
Therefore, any attempt to play around with it with the
aim of changing leads to a severe punishment from Allāh. Those who are
knowledgeable of that Day are knowledgeable, and those who are ignorant will
remain ignorant!
Having said this, those who do not cease to call in
the name of ijtihād, have no problem in sacrificing their
linguistic legacy and everything that it contains of rules and principles, when
they know that it will be a stepping stone that will lead to the vainly playing
around with the principles of the sharī
̀ah and its rules, all of this in the name of research and ijtihād-especially
when they know that many of the rules of the sharī ̀ah are taken from its texts and are
preserved within the protection of the rules of the Arabic language and its
principles. So if these Arabic rules are destroyed and are able to be changed,
then those principles (of the sharī ̀ah) can also be played
around with in vain!
So why do we imagine and hypothesize?.. Didn’t the
first writer whom I have alluded to toward the end of the first essay of this
book explicitly call toward that? The one who wrote, calling upon muslims to a
new reading of the Qurān, one that overlooks the restrictions of its linguistic
interpretation and the principles of the Arabic language?!
And I know that there are others who also echo these
very sentiments. Another one who called for this new reading was himself a
Muslim who holds a position of Islamic Studies at the
But there is no doubt that these echoes have never
affirmed itself in the ears of those who are aware until today. Will it then
find an abode or an environment (that will accept it) while the Islamic
awakening has gained momentum and Muslims are more aware what they are
commanded with and what plotting surround them?
Secondly, we must not forget, while we are debating
the question of ijtihād in this era, that the identity of Muslims
today is lost, and the traits of their civilization and essence are forgotten
and extinct. Therefore no one can debate over this reality.(the reality of ijtihād)
In this climate, these people are calling for ijtihād,
and for the liberation from the shackles of following and imitating. We all
know that many of these loud voices are in fact expressing the sentiment of
following Western civilization, more than expressing a pure desire for ijtihād
that enlightens us about the rules of Allāh the Most High.
So what meaning can ijtihād have in this
condition besides the fact that it is a new support and force towards this
stream, one that melts down the remainder of traits that connect us to our identity and origin?
Thirdly, despite all of this, we say that this bitter
reality does not exempt Muslims from the necessity of research in the new
problems and issues that this era had brought and also the changed values and
customs. The study of these problems and conditions, with all seriousness and
sincerity, fall without any doubt, under the ambit of our Islamic
responsibilities that Allāh had ordained us with.
And if what is intended by ijtihād, is
what we call for today regarding this type of ijtihād, it is
necessary that scholars of understanding and specialization among the Muslims
not be lethargic in this process. We are certain however, that this
responsibility is not neglected in our times; there are many scholars who are
seriously devoted to this kind of ijtihād studies and that the
universities are flourishing with their own research and achievements in this
regard.
We must not forget to add that the necessity of this
type of compulsory ijtihād (in order that we may reach our desired
objectives) should move side by side with the shouldering of another
responsibility, and that is attaching extreme importance at every level, to the
restoring of our Islamic identity, starting with the stabilization of our
belief which is free from deviation and whims, and giving due care to the
Islamic rulings pertaining to morals which are embedded in the different types
of rituals and worship, and all other individual and social responsibilities on
the level of the individual and societal level.
This current will become visible and strong if its
presence is felt in society by using the tools of the media, newspapers and
other publishing, without any contradiction in the approach that is used.
In view of carrying this first fundamental
responsibility, it is not only possible but necessary to establish institutions
or fiqh academies which can bring together the best Muslim scholars in
their knowledge, action and piety, so that they may shoulder the responsibility
of studies related to ijitihād in every new issue or problem that
has occurred or that is developing and that requires a legal ruling. Further,
all the things that the principles and rules of the sharī ̀ah require from us to visit, should
be re-considered.
The best instrument to carry forward this
responsibility is a fiqh academy that is comprised of, as I have
mentioned, the best Muslim scholars, on condition that it must not be subservient
to the government of any country in the Arab or Islamic world. The reason is so
that it does not become influenced by any opposing political currents, which
will turn it into just another instrument of spreading a particular political
directive or supporting a particular theological school of thought.[102]
In summary, solving the problem of ijtihād lies in the foundation that must be
established first, and this cannot be established except if we have a
discussion and dialogue with those persons whose voices have become hoarse in
calling for ijtihād and that there is nothing else but ijtihād,
and the dialogue must revolve around the following decisive points:
- Do we adopt Islām as a form of
submission and devotion to Allāh the Most High, or is it just a
heritage that we are proud of and we colour it the way we wish, even with the
colour of desires and whims?
- Is Islamic civilization- in our firm opinion-the
origin of everything, and Islām as a religion merely one of its results or
fruits? Or is Islām as a religion the origin of everything, while
Islām as a civilization is just one of its results or fruits?
Lastly, what is more important than addressing the
problem of taqlīd (following) and ijtihād, and
searching for a common ground between Islām and Western culture, is to
convince all Muslims at every level, by using academic proofs and illuminating
objectivity, that Islām as a civilization, which astonishes so many
researchers and writers, can never take off except if it is grounded on the
foundation of Islām as a religion and devotion.
The distant past, the present that we are engaged in
as well as the near future which sparkles in the horizons, all bear great
testimony to this.
دور الاعلام
الاسلامي في
مواجهة الحرب
النفسية في
المجتمع
الاسلامي
المعاصر
The role of Islamic media in combating the
psychological undermining of contemporary Muslim society
Abstract: Contemporary
society as whole, and Muslim society in particular, is subjected to the
subversion of secular media. The strategies employed include the following:
eroding religious belonging and culture; diffusing alternative, secular
ideologies; and propaganda. An effective Islamic media is a necessary antidote
to such insidious penetration. The importance of its role is underpinned by the
fact that psychological damage to Muslims is, in the Islamic scheme of things,
more dangerous than physical destruction.
مـقدّمـة
الإعلام
والإتصال
حقيقة
اجتماعية
قديم قدم
الانسان ذاته
طالما
يستخدمه بني
البـشر كآلة للبناء
أو للهدم أو
للتوطيد أو
للتأثير ولكن
وسائله وأساليـبه
هي التي تتغير
وتتطور حسب
تغير وتتطور
الظروف
والأحوال. لقد
عرف الإعلام
طريقه إلى كل
البيئات
واحتل مكانه
في كل العصور
ذلك أن مطالب
الإنسان لا
تقتصر على
تزويده بالحاجات
المادية
كالطعام والشراب
والمأوى
ولكنها تتعدى
ذلك إلى رغبة
في الاتصال
بأمثاله من
ذوي البشر، وتعتبر
هذه الرغبة في
الاتصال من
المطالب
الأساسية التي
أصبحت ضرورة
حيوية للحفاظ على
الجنس البشري.[103]
وإذا
كان الاتصال بالجماهير
في
العصورالحديثة
يشمُل
الإعلام والدعاية
والاعلان
والعلاقات
العامة والثقافة
والحرب
النفسية ... وما
إلى ذلك، فلنا
أن نعلم أن
العصور
القديمة لم تقتصر
عن هذه
الميادين رغم
إختلاف
الصورة
والشكل في
البيئات
القديمة عن
الحديثة.
وإذا
كان الاتصال بالجماهير
في العصر
الحديث يملك
الوسائل
الحديثة مثل الاذاعة
والتليفزيون
والسينما والمسرح
والمجلة
والانترنت
فلنا أن نعلم
أن العصور القديمة
أيضا لها
مالها من الوسائل
والأساليب
المناسبة
للاتصال
بالجماهير مثل
التجارة
وبعثة الوفود
والشعر والخطبة
والأعياد وما
إلى ذلك.
وإذا
كان الإعلام
في العصر
الحديث قادرا
على تثبيت بعض
القيم أو هدم
الآراء
والنظريات
مثل قيمة نشر
السـلام
العالمي
والتقارب والتفاهم
الدولي حتى
يتحقق
للمجتمع
الإنساني
البقاء والتطور
والنماء
فالإعلام في الأيام
الغابرة
ايضا، يملك
نفـس الآثار
في المجتمع حيث
إستطاع أن
يغرس بعض التقاليد
والعادات بل
وتحريك الشعب
ومن يسوسه على
مواجهة
الغارات
العدوانية أو التسامح
مع الدول
الجانحة
للسلم وإبرام
العقود والمواثيق
وما إلى ذلك
من الآثار الإعلامية
التي يكاد
يكون يومها
كأمسها.
ولما
جاء الرسل برسالات
ربهم حاضوا في
تلك الميادين
المذكورة
لتـبليغ
الرسالة الى
الجمهور واستغلوا
بعض تلك
الوسائل
الموجودة في
مجتمعاتهم،
وبالزيادة
أنزل الله
عليهم الكتب والصحف
وكلفهم تبليغ
الرسالة
لهداية
البشرية وقال سبحانه
وتعالى: "يَاأَيُّهَا
الرَّسُولُ
بَلِّغْ
مَآأُنزِلَ
إِلَيْكَ مِن
رَّبِّكَ
وَإِن لَّمْ
تَفْعَلْ
فَمَا بَلَّغْتَ
رِسَالَتَهُ
وَاللهُ
يَعْصِمُكَ
مِنَ
النَّاسِ
إِنَّ اللهَ
لاَيَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ
الْكَافِرِينَ"
{المائدة/4: 67}.
وقد
بلّغ الرسول صلى
الله عليه
وسلم رسالة
ربه وأدى
الأمانة في بناء
المجتمع
المدني
الأفضل
بالكلمة والحديث
العادى
والخطبة
والكتاب وكل
ما أتيح له من
الوسائل
الإعلامية في
عهده. وفي عصرنا
الحاضر تطورت
وسائل
الإعلام
وتعددت، وبعد
أن كانت
الخطبة تمثل 80%
من وسائل الإعلام
أصبحت لا تمثل
إلا 20% وجدت
وسائل كثيرة
للإعلام مثل
الإذاعة
والتليفزيون والسينما
والمسرح
والمجلة
والكتاب
والصحيفة
والأناشيد
والتمـثيليات
والملصقات والمنشورات
وغيرها.
وما
على الدعاة
والتجمعات الإسلامية
في جنوب
أفريقيا
الذين أنيطت
بهم مسؤولية
تحقيق خير أمة
أخرجت للناس وبناء
المجتمع
الأفضل
المستحق بأن
يكون قدوة
لغيره من
المجتمعات
الأخرى لما
تميز به من بث
الأمر
بالمعروف
والنهي عن
المنكر إلا أن
يستغلوا جميع
الوسائل المتاحة
لنشر الدعوة
وأن يستخدموا
سلاح العصر
وأسلوبه فالله
تعالى يقول : "وَأَعِدُّوا
لَهُم مَّااسْتَطَعْتُم
مِّن
قُوَّةٍ..."{الأنفال/8:
60}
والعلماء
يقولون : "إن
القوة تكون في
كل عصر بما
يناسبه" ولابد
أن يكون سلاح المؤمن
أرقى سلاح
ممكن لإحراز
النصر لأن ما لايتم
الواجب إلا به
فهو واجب،
وكذلك أسلوب
الدعوة
وأداتها لابد
أن نستغل ما
يتاح لنا من
الإذاعة
والتليفزيون
و الصحافة والمجلات
وغيرها وأن
نعرض الإسلام
بلغة
العصرحتى نؤدى
فريضة الله،
فقد أخذ الله الميثاق
على العلماء:
"... لَتُبَيِّنُنَّهُ
لِلنَّاسِ
وَلاَتَكْتُمُونَهُ
..."{آل عمران/3: 187}
وأسلوب الدعوة
يكون في كل
عصر بما يناسبه
حتى تقوم
الحجة لله على
عباده ويتحقق
إبلاغ الناس
دين الله
بطريقة
تحرك فيهم
دواعي
الاقناع
والقبول قال
الله تعالى: "اُدْعُ
إِلَى سَبِيْلِ
رَبِّكَ
بِالْحِكْمَةِ
وَالْمَوْعِظَةِ
الْحَسَنَةِ
وَجَادِلْهُمْ
بِالَّتِيْ
هِيَ
أَحْسَنُ..."{النحل/16:
125} وقد أدت
وسائل
الإعلام دورا بارزا
في العصر
الحديث.[104]
"وعلى الرغم
من أن الإعلام
بأجهزته ووسائله
ونظرياته
وتقنياته
الحديثة كان
غير معروفا وقت
نزول الوحي
على صاحب الرسالة
صلى الله عليه
وسلم، إلا أنه
بتطبيق
المقاييس
العملية
الحالية على
الدور الملقى
على عاتق
الدعوة
الإسلامية
نستطيع أن
نقول إن
الإعلام كان
ولازال أداة
هذا الدين
ودعامته
الرئيسة.
ولن
نتجاوز
الحقيقة إذا
سمينا
الأشياء
بمسمياتها
الصحيحة حين
نقول إن الدين
الإسلامي دين
دعوة...والدعوة
عمل إعلامي بكل
ما تحمل هذه العبارة
من معنى في
أذهان أساتذة
وخبراء
الإعلام والاتصال
بالجماهير".[105]
-141[1] محي الدين
عبد الحليم، الإعلام
الإسلامي
وتطبيقاته
العملية،
(مصر:
الخانجي، دت)
ص. 14
هذه
المقدمة منقولة
من رسالة
الدكتوراة
للكاتب التي
نوقشت في تاريخ
6 \ يناير\ 2005 بالجامعة
الاسلامية
الحكومية
شريف هداية
الله – جاكرتا –
اندونيسيا .
مفهوم
الاعلام الاسلامي
اذا
علمنا أن
الاعلام يعني
نشر الكلمة أو
الخبر أو
الرأي أو
الفكر أو الصورة
على
عامة الناس
باحدى
الوسائل
الاعلامية الموجودة
فلنا أن نعلم
أن الاعلام
الاسلامي
هو نشر الكلمة
أو الخبر أو
الرأي أو
الفكر أو
الصورة عن
الاسلام على
عامة الناس مع
مراعاة الصدق و
الأمانة في
النشر التبليغ
. اذن فالاعلام
الاسلامي جزء
من الدعوة
الاسلامية
وهو من أول
يومه يعمل في
ميدانين : الميدان
الدفاعي و
الميدان
التبليغي .
هذه
المقالة
ستتحدث عن الجناح
الدفاعي أكثر
كما هو واضح
في عنوان
المقالة أعني
المواجهة .
و
الجناح
الدفاعي للاعلام
الاسلامي
يعني الرد على
حملات
الاعلام العدواني
للاسلام
ومؤامرة
أعداء الاسلام
وبيان ما في
تلك الحملات
من زيف
وأباطيل تهدف
الى تشكيك
المسلمين في
حقائق دينهم
حتى ينصرفوا
عنه كليا أو
على الأقل حتى
لا يتحمسوا
بأمور دينهم .
كما تهدف الى
صد الناس عن
الاسلام .
وتلك العملية
الخبيثة هي ما
تسمى في
الاصطلاح
الاعلامي المعاصر
بالحرب
النفسية أو
الغزو الفكري
.
الحرب
النفيسة
لم
يكن مصطلح
الحرب النفسية
موجودا في عصر
النبوة و لكن
مضمون الحرب
النفسية كان
قائما و كان
سابقا لكل
العصور فهو
جزء من حرب
الانسان
للانسان التي واكبت
رحلة البشرية
على ظهر الارض
واذا نظرنا
الآن الى
مفهوم الحرب
النفسية نجد
سيلا من
المسميات
الغامضة و
المخيفة ، غزو
الفكر ، غسيل
الأدمغة ، حرب
الأعصاب ، الطابور
الخامس ،
الحرب
السياسية ، حرب
الأفكار ،
الحرب
الباردة ، حرب
الكلمات ، والعدوان
غير المباشر،
وما الى ذلك من
المصطلحات
التي تستخدم
للحروب
اللاسلاحية التي
كانت نتائجها
أدهى و أمر من
نتائج الحروب
التي تستخدم
فيها
الدبابات
و
القنابل كما
أن آثارها أدوم
وضحاياها
تذوق ويلاتها
الى الأبد و
قد تعرقل
مسيرة الأجيال
القادمة انها لفتنة
و الفتنة أشد
من القتل وقد
لجأ الأعداء
الى هذا النوع
من الحروب
المعنوية لما
رأو أن الموت
في سبيل
الدفاع عن
الاسلام أمر مقدس
في تعاليم
الاسلام بل
وفي تعاليم
اية عقيدة من
العقائد
الحية وأن الموجهة
بالسلاح
تكلفهم النفس
و النفيس ثم تكون
عليهم حسرة
آثروا
المؤامرة على
المواجهة و( النفسية
على السلاحية
) وكانوا يستخدمون
الاذاعات
السرية و
المنشورات
المجهولة والدعايات
السافرة بدلا
من الدبابات و
القنابل
الذرية
واللأسلحة
النووية
فكانت النتيجة
هي نشر البلبلة
وتحطيم الجيوش
و النفوس من
الداخل
وبعثرة جهود
الأمم وتسميم
المناخ
الاجتماعي و
السياسي وشتات
الأمور
والقلق و
الحجر على
التفكير
واعاقة التقدم
وما الى ذلك
من النتائج السلبية
المارة .
واذا
كانت الحرب النفسية
أو الغزو
الفكري مصطلح
جديد في
العالم المعاصر
الا أن
المفهوم قديم
قدم البشرية
ذاتها ذلك لأن
الانسان حاول
منذ القدم أن
يهزم خصمه
بالعقل الى
جانب القوة وحاول
أن يهزم خصمه
بالخوف
والبلبلة و
اشاعة الفتن قبل
آلاف السنين
والأمثلة التاريخية
في استخدام
الحرب
النفسية أكثر
من الحصر يطول
بنا الكلام في
عرض النماذج لذلك
ويكفينا في
هذه المقالة
الوجيزة
نماذج الحرب
النفسية التي
مارسها
الكفار في عصر
الرسول صلى
الله عليه
وسلم بهدف
اجهاض دعوته
والصد عن
سبيله .
أساليب
الحرب
النفسية في
عصر النبوة
لقد
مارس كفار
قريش والذين
في قلوبهم مرض
عدة أساليب في
محاربة
الرسول والذين
آمنوا معه ومن
أساليبهم المشهورة
ما يلي :
التكذيب :
كانت الخطوة
الأولى في
الدعاية
المضادة
للدعوة عقب
الطور العلني
مباشرة هو
اعلان كذب الدعوة
وتكذيب
صاحبها
فعمد زعماء
الكفر الى
شعراء قريش
وكان أشهرهم
ابو سفيان بن
الحارث وعمرو
بن العاص وعبد
الله بن الزبعري
لينالوا من
الرسول
ويكذبوه .
الاتهام
بالسحر و
الشعر والكهانة :
وكلها سقطت
بسرعة بنزول
الآيات التي
أبطلت هذه
الاتهامات .
طلب
المعجزة :
وقد لجأ اليهود
الى هذا
الاسلوب
لاسقاط دعوة
الرسول
وقالوا يا
محمد ان الله
يضع لرسوله
اذا بعثه ما
يشاء ويقدره
منه على ما
أراد فأنزل
علينا كتابا
من السماء
نقرؤه ونعرفه
.
السب
و الشتم : مر
أبو جهل يوما
بالرسول يوما
فآذاه وشتمه
وعاب دينه وزاد
في التهوين من
أمره فأعرض الرسول
عنه وانصرف
ولم يكلمه
فلما رجع حمزة
من رحلة صيده
وعلم بذلك
ملأه الغضب وذهب
الى الكعبة
فلقى ابا جهل
فرفع القوس
فضربه به ضربة
شجت رأسه و
أراد رجال من بني
مخزوم أن
ينصروا أبا
جهل فمنعهم
خوفا من ازدياد
الشر قائلا
انه سب أخيه
سبا قبيحا .
الغمز
و اللمز : وكان
أمية بن خلف
كلما رأى رسول
الله سبه علنا
أو سرا فنزل
قوله تعالى " ويل
لكل همزة لمزة
المنافسة :
كان الرسول
اذا جلس مجلسا
يدعو فيه الى
الله تعالى
وتلا القرآن
وحذر قريشا من
الأمم السابقة
فكان النضر بن
الحارث من
قريش يجلس
مجلس الرسول
بعد فراغه من
دعوة القوم للاسلام
ويجمع الناس
فيحكي لهم قصص
رستم وملوك
فارس القدماء
. ثم يقول ما
محمد بأحسن
مني حديثا وما
أحاديثه الا
أساطير
الأولين .
محمد
سيد محمد : المسئولية
الاعلامية في
الاسلام (
مكتبة
الخانجي
القاهرة 1983 م ) ط1
,174 وفيه
تصرف يسير
وهذه
هي أساليب
الغزو الفكري
في عصر الرسول
وأما أساليب
الغزو الفكري
في عصرنا
الحالي فهي
كثيرة
ومتنوعة منها
ما يأتي :
البرامج
التلفزيونية
و الاذاعية
المستوردة :
لا شك أن قصور
التلفزيون
الاسلامي
خاصة و التلفزيون
في العالم
النامي عامة
في تغطية
ساعات
الارسال اليومية
بالانتاج
الاسلامي و
المحلي الجيد
هو المدخل
الرئيسي
لعمليات
الغزو الفكري
التي تجتاح
عالمنا اليوم
فالاستعانة بالأفلام
والمسلسلات وأشكال
الدراما
الأجنبية
المستوردة من
عالم لا يدين
بديننا ولا
يلتزم
عقيدتنا ولا
يتخلق
بأخلاقنا
ناهيك عن اختلاف
عاداته
وتقاليده
وأعرافه السائدة
وقيمه
الاجتماعية
والسياسية
ودرجة تحضره وتصرفات
أفراده الى
غير ذلك من فروق
جوهرية هي في
حقيقة الأمر
مأساة حقيقية
للاذاعة
والتلفزيون
في الدول
النامية والاسلامية
منها بصفة
خاصة .
يحيى
بسيوني مصطفى وعادل
الصيرفي :
التلفزيون
الاسلامي
ودوره في التنمية
(د م عالم
الكتب د
ت ص300 .
والنشرات
الاذاعية والتلفزيونية
عبر تلك
البرامج
المستوردة
وان لم تدع
مباشرة الى
نبذ الدين الا
أن منها ما
يدعو الى
التخفيف من
قيود الدين و
التشكيك في
الأمور
العقائدية
وتصوير
الملتزم بالدين
بصورة
المتخلف
والمتحمس
بصورة
الارهاب كما أن
بعضها تثير
الجنس وتحرض
على الاباحية
بشكل مباشر أو
غير مباشر . و
الحل من هذا
هو التحرك من
قبل رجال
صدقوا ما عاهدوا
الله عليه من
العلماء و
المثقفين على
مراقبة ما
تنشر في
الاذاعة و التلفزيون
وفوق ذلك يجب
أن يحركوا
المحترفين في
هذا المجال أن
يؤلفوا
أفلاما دينية تبادل
تلك الأفلام
الالحادية
وهذا اذاكان
في الدول
الاسلامية أو
في دولة ذات أكثرية
مسلمة وأما في
الدولة ذات
الأقلية
المسلمة مثل
بلدناهذا –
جنوب أفريقيا
– اني أقترح أن
تتكاثف
المؤسسات
والهيئات
الاسلامية و
الاتصال
بأغنياء
المسلمين في الداخل
و الخارج على
فتح قناة تلفزيونية
محلية تنشر ما
يرضي الله
ورسوله وتذيع
ما ينفع الجيل
الصاعد من
أبناء هذا
الوطن ويسهل
هذا المشروع
الحرية الصحفية
التي تتمتع
بها جنوب
أفريقيا وقد
يستصعب من سمع
هذا الاقتراح
ولكنني أقول
اذا سهل في
الاذاعة المسموعة
ليس بعزيز
ايجاد ذلك في الاذاعة
المرئية اذا
قويت النية
وثقفت
الاستراتيجية
.
الكتابات
الصحفية المارقة :
ان دور وسائل
الاعلام
عموما هو
حماية المباديء
والقيم
الاجتماعية
ورعاية الحق
والتثقيف
والترفيه
والتسلية
الصحيحة والتوجيه
الجيد ولكن
للأسف الشديد
تجد بعض
الكتابات
الصحفية
المنحرفة عن
هذه الأصول بحجة
ارضاء أذواق
الناس جميعا
والسير وفق
الأمزجة
المتضاربة
المختلفة
وبعض الكتابات
يهمها الدفاع
عن الباطل
ومحاربة الحق
والدين
وبعضها يهمها
نشر البلبلة
وتشكيك الناس
في مبادئهم
الدينية
والثقافية
والاجتماعية بحجة
حرية الصحافة
وأدل الدليل
على ذلك حادثة
كاريكاتور
النبي في احدى
الصحف الدنماركية
ورواية "دافينشي
كود " للكاتب
الروائي دان
براون التي
أساءت في حق
النبي عيسى
عليه السلام
بحجة حرية
الصحافة
والبحث
والابتكار وأمثال
هذه الكتابات
الحمراء
كثيرة
ومتنوعة منها
على المستوى
الدولي ومنها
على المستوى
المحلي .
فيجب
الاهتمام من
قبل الصحافة
الاسلامية
بأمور
المسلمين
والدفاع عن
الاسلام ونقد
كل ما يمس
حرمة الاسلام و
المسلمين من
الكتابات
الصحفية
الضالة سواء
في الداخل أو
الخارج لا
سيما وأن أكثر
الدول
الاسلامية
تتمتع بوفرة
من الصحف
الاسلامية والمنظمات
الصحافية
والمراكز الاعلامية
المتنوعة .
وأما الدول
ذات الأقلية
المسلمة مثل
بلدنا هذا –
جنوب أفريقيا
– فاني أرى
الواجب ان
تجتمع القوة
لايجاد مركز
اعلامي يعمل
لخدمة
الاسلام و
المسلمين
ويدافع عن
بيضة الأمة
وينقد كل ما ينشر
عن الاسلام
ظلما وعدوانا
سواءا في
الداخل أو
الخارج كما
يجب على الصحف
الاسلامية –
المجلات
والجرائد –
الاهتمام بأمور
المسلمين
وتفسيرها
والتعليق
عليها وبيان ما
فيها من أمور
قد تخفى على
عامة الناس .
وهذا واجب في
نظرنا لأن
الاعلام لسان
الأمة تتقدم
بتقدم
الاعلام فيها وتتأخر
بتأخر
الاعلام فيها
.
انتشار
تيارات الغزو الفكري :
ومن الويلات
التي تتعرض
لها الأمة
الاسلامية
اليوم هي
انتشار
تيارات وشبكات
فكرية تدعو
الى تقليد
الغرب في كل
كبير وصغير
وهذه
التيارات لا
تؤمن ابدا بامكانية
تقدم الأمة
الا بعد
التخلص من
عاداتها
وتقاليدها
وأخلاقها
ومبادئها
التي آمنت بها
. ودعاة هذه
التيارات هم
أدباؤنا
الذين تعلموا
في الغرب
وشبابنا
الذين زاروه
ومثقفونا
الذين قرأوا
له انبهروا في
مرحلة أولية
من حياتهم
بهذه الأفكار لأنهم
قارنوا
العمران
والتصنيع في
بلادهم يما
رأوا خارج
أوطانهم
فوجدوا البون شاسعا
والفرق هائلا
وعليه أخذوا
كل ما في
الغرب على أنه
قدوة ومثل .
يحيى
بسيوني مصطفى وعادل
الصيرفي :
التلفزيون
الاسلامي
ودوره في التنمية
ص 308
ومن
أبرز أمثلة
هذه التيارات
الفكرية
المستوردة ما
يلي :
العلمانية : وهي
الدعوة الى
فصل الدين عن
الدولة وطرح الشريعة
جانبا لتحل
محلها
القوانين
الوضعية
الملزمة
وبذلك يتوارى
الدين جانبا منزويا
حتى يصبح
علىمر الأيام
معتقد
كلاسيكي عتيق
لا يلائم روح
العصر و تقدمه
.
هذه
الأفكار دعت اليها
طوائف غير
قليلة في داخل
أوطان
المسلمين
وخارجها بل
وصل بهم الأمر
الى اتهام
الاسلام بأنه
لايصلح كأساس
للدولة وعليه
أن يعتكف
ليصبح رمزا لا
غير ولم تخل
البلاد
الاسلامية من
دعاة الى
لأفكار
اعلمانية
خاصة في لبنان
ومصر وسوريا وتونس
والعراق
وأفغانستان
وغيرها .
الليبرالية :
وهي وليدة
العلمانية
وجزء منها وقد
يطلقون عليها
الليبرالية
الاسلامية
وهي تدعو الى التحرر
الفكري
والتخلص من
قيود الدين
وغالبا ما يطعنون
في كثير من
النصوص
القرآنية والحديث
بحجة عدم
ملاءمتها
للحياة
المعاصرة .
وشبكة الليبرالية
الاسلامية
منتشرة في
البلدان
الاسلامية
وتتمتع
بالدعم
السياسي الكبيروالمساعدات
المالية
الضخمة تفيض اليها
من أمريكا
وأوروبا ولا
يكاد يصدر
كتاب من رجال
هذه الحركة
الخبيثة الا ويترجم
مباشرة الى
عدة لغات
عالمية وقد ضل
كثير من الجامعيين
بقراءة هذه
الكتب . ولا شك
أن فكرة
العلمانية و
الليبرالية
وغيرها من
الأفكار
الضالة خطر يحدق
بأمتنا الاسلامية
وعلينا
استنفار
قوتنا
الفكرية
والعقائدية جميعا
للتصدي لهذه
التيارات المخربة
المنحرفة ولا
ريب أن
الوسائل
الاعلامية
الاسلامية
قادرة على كشف
هذه الأباطيل
وأن المراكز
الاعلامية الاسلامية
قادرة على دحض حجج
هذه الفئة
الضالة من
خلال عقد
الندوات
العلمية و
المناقشات
الفكرية
والنشرات
الاخبارية والكتابات
التي تتضمن
الحوار
الهاديء
والمنطق
المقنع والحجة
الدامغة
لعلها تهتدي الى
هدى والى صراط
مستقيم .
المادية
: وهي
نزعة فكرية
الحادية لا
تؤمن الا بالمادة
و المحسوس وما
عداها هباء .
يقول أحد
زعماءها الفيلسوف
الملحد
برتراند راسل
: فيما يختص
بالدين فقد
انتهى بي
الأمر الى أن
كفرت أولا بحرية
الارادة ثم
بخلود الروح وأخيرا
بالله "
يحيى
هاشم حسن
فرغلي : في
مواجهة
الالحاد
المعاصر
وعقائد العلم
ص 192 نقلا عن
مقدمة كتاب
برتراند راسل
( فلسفتي كيف
تطورت -
ص 4 ) .
ويلحق
بالماديين بالمفهوم
الوا سع
للكلمة من
تكون الدنيا
أكبر همهم ومبلغ
علمهم وهم
للأسف اليوم كثير
وهم ليسوا من
الملاحدة
ولكنهم لا
يعملون للآخرة لا
ينكرون وجود
الله ولكن لا
يذكرونه في
السر والعلن و
لا يعملون أي شيء
ابتغاء وجهه
الكريم .
ودور
الوسائل
الاعلامية
عظيم لتبيان
الحق وتوضيح
طريق الهدى
المستقيم
وذلك
بالتركيز على
أن المادة
زائلة فانية
وأن الباقية هي
الدار الآخرة
عند مليك
مقتدر هو الله
الواحد لا
شريك له خالق
المادة
والروح والكائنات
جميعا . وآيات
الله في هذا
الشأن كثيرة
مثل قوله
تعالى " وما
هذه الحياة
الدنيا الا
لهو ولعب وان
الدار الآخرة
لهي الحيوان
لو كانوا
يعلمون " سورة
العنكبوت 64 ،
ويؤكد رسوله
عليه الصلاة
والسلام ذلك
بقوله " والله
ما الدنيا في
الآخرة
الامثل ما
يجعل أحدكم
اصبعه في اليم
فلينظر بم
يرجع " حديث
صحيح جاء في
مصابيح السنة
للبغوي .
الاباحية : وهي
تيار الحادي
مجرم ينتشر في
أوساط المجتمعات
الاسلامية
يقتل عقول
الشباب
بالمخدرات
وروحهم
بالجنس وهي لا
ترى أي دور للمرأة
في الحياة سوى
أن تكون محركة
للشهوة في
النفوس وقصة
الحب في عقلية
المراهقين
وتستغل
الوسائل
الاعلامية في
نشر جمال
الممثلات وزينتهن
لفتنة الجيل الجديد
و الفتنة أشد
من القتل وعلى
الاعلام
الاسلامي أن
يحارب الفساد
واعلام الفجور
ويكشف عن
أضرار انتشار
الزنا
والفواحش في
المجتمع .
الماسونية
: وهي
حركة سرية
تدعي
المصلحية
والتعاونية ولكنها
في الحقيقة لا
تعمل الا
لمصلحة
الصهيونية وتقوية
الحكومة
الاسرائيلية
و تحقيق أهداف
اليهودية
التي كان
أهمها
السيطرة على العالم
وقد انضم
اليها الكثير
من أثرياء
المسلمين
ورؤسائهم
وأمرائهم و
الشخصيات البارزة
جهلا عن طوية
هذه الحركة الخبيثة
ولذا تراهم
أحيانا لهم قلوب لا يعقلون
بها ولهم أعين
لا يبصرون بها
ولهم آذان لا
يسمعون بها صم
بكم عمي فهم
لا يرجعون
لأنهم مقيدون
بعدة شروط
وأخطرها انه
لو خرج من هذه
المنظمة أو لم
يعمل لمصلحة
الحركة أو خرج
من تعليمات
الماسونية
يفوته منصبه
أو وظيفته أو
ثروته وهذه أخطر
وأخبث الحركات
التي أنشئت
لمحاربة
المسلمين
ولغزو أفكارهم
.
فيجب
على الاعلام الاسلامي
أن يكشف عن
خفايا
الماسونية
وأضرارها
والجرائم
التي
ارتكبتها ، كم
من اغتيال وكم
من انقلاب وكم
من الحروب
الأهلية
والدولية
التي وراءها
الحركة الماسونية
.
كما
يجب على علماء
المسلمين أن
يبذلوا كل ما
في وسعهم
لارجاع
الحكام ووجهاء
المسلمين الى
الصراط المستقيم
سواء
بالاتصال
المباشر أو
بارسال
التوجيهات
والارشادات
مع التضرع الى
الله تعالى أن
يهديهم
و كل هذه
الأساليب معروفة
في تاريخ دعوة
الرسول صلى
الله عليه
وسلم .
الخاتمة
النتائج :
ان
المسلمين
اليوم يعيشون
داخل
مجتمعاتهم في
غربة كبيرة
بسبب بعدهم عن
دينهم وتدخل
أعدائهم في
شئونهم وبسبب
تفرقهم
واختلافهم بل
وتقاتلهم
وتناحرهم ، فعلى
الاعلام
الاسلامي بكل
وسائله المعروفة
دور كبير في
ذلك اذ يجب
عليه تذكير
الأمة بماضيها
وأيام قوتها
وعظمتها وازدهارها
ودعوتها الى
نبذ الفرقة
والبعد عن
الخرافات والأوهام
وترك العمل
بنصائح
الأعداء لتفريق
المسلمين
خاصة العرب .
ان
على الاعلام الاسلامي
واجب ديني
كبير نحو
تقديم الحل
الاسلامي لأي
مشكلة تحدث في
أي دولة
اسلامية أو
مجتمع مسلم
ووصف العلاج
لأي مرض يظهر
في أي مجتمع
من المجتمعات
الاسلامية .
ومن
الأمراض
الموجودة بالدول
الاسلامية
حاليا ما يعد
مشكلات كبيرة
استعصت على
الحل بسبب
البعد عن منهج
الاسلام ما
يأتي :
وجود
التغريب
وأساليبه
التي غيرت وجه
العادات
والتقاليد الاسلامية
دون مقاومة
تذكر من قبل
الاعلام
الاسلامي
قلة
الاهتمام
بقضايا الأقليات
المسلمة في
الدول غير
الاسلامية .
وجود
بعض الأفراد
الذين يدينون
بمذاهب مادية
هدامة
كالاشتراكية
والعلمانية
والليبرالية
أو بأديان
باطلة
كالقاديانية
والبهائية
دون مقاومة تذكر
من المسئولين
.
وجود
نوادي الروتاري
الماسونية
والمنظمات
الالحادية
التي تنشر أساليب
الغزو الفكري
.
الاقتراحات :
ولحل
المشاكل
المذكورة
سابقا وغيرها
مما لم يذكر
نقدم هذه الاقتراحات
الآتية ونحث
على العمل بها
بعد دراستها :
نقترح
ايجاد مجمع الاعلام
والاتصال
الاسلامي في
كل مجتمع من
المجتمعات
الاسلامية
وهذا المجمع –
بطبيعة الحال
– هو الذي يضع
على عاتقه ما
يلي :
مسئولية
بناء محطات
اذاعية
وتليفزيونية
ثقيلة الوزن
التي تتولى
نشر الاسلام
الى كل مكان .
دراسة
نفسية الناس
في المجتمع
المراد
تنويره
بالاسلام .
دراسة
التيارات
الفكرية
المعاصرة
واستخلاص
عصارتها
الفكرية في
سبيل اعداد
دراسات نقدية كاملة
عنها وبأقلام
كفوؤة .
بناء
العلاقة بين
مجتمعنا هنا
وبين
المجتمعات
الاسلامية الأخرى
في جميع انحاء
العالم .
ايجاد
مجمع البحوث
والدراسات
الاسلامية
بهدف اثراء
المكتبة
الاسلامية
بالبحوث
العلمية و الاعلامية
والبحث عن
مسيرة
التربية
والتعليم في
المجتمع .
وأخيرا
نقول يجب أن
تبدأ الجهود
من الآن وعلى
حسب
الامكانية ان الله
لا يغير ما
بقوم حتى
يغيروا ما
بأنفسهم .
Dr Salie Abrahams is Registrar at
IPSA
Shaykh Hoosain Ebrahim is a lecturer and
Head of Student Records at IPSA
Luqmaan Kagee is a student at
Dr Ahmad Abdul Malik is a lecturer in
Arabic at IPSA
Shaykh Ebrahim Moos is a lecturer in
Hadith at IPSA
Mawlana Ahmed Mukadam is the Rector of
IPSA
Shaykh Dr Abdul Karim Toffar is lecturer in
Fiqh and Head of Department [
[1] Borrowed from the psychological concept, referring to internal individual processes
[2] Borrowed from the psychological concept, referring to process happening between individuals
[3] Borrowed from the psychological concept, referring to process happening between sectors
[4] Tamimi, Azzam, Political Pluralism and Modern Arab Islamic Thought, 2001.
[5] Ibid
[6] Moussali Ahmad S. The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and
Human Rights, University Press
[7] Tariq Ramadan, British Identity, The
Guardian, 2005.
[8] Kaymakcan Recep. Internet Article. Professor of Religious
Education,
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Moussali Ahmad S. The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights, University Press Florida 2001.
[12] Moussali Ahmad S. The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights, University Press Florida 2001.
[13] Tamimi, ibid.
[14] Ibid
[15]Quoted by Tamimi, ibid
[16] As discussed by Tamimi, ibid.
[17] Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities.
[18] This
is an amended sub-section of the author’s doctoral thesis on Islamic Family and
Personal Law submitted to the former University of Durban-Westville (UDW), now
incorporated, along with the
[19]Dār al-Ma`ārif: Lisān al-`Arab,
Dār
al-Mashriq: Al-Munjid fī al-Lughah
wa al-`Ilām,
[20] MacMillan & Co.: International Encyclopeadia of the Social Sciences,
[21] Dicania M: The
Encyclopaedia of Marriage,
[22] Tizard B: Adoption:
A Second Chance,
[23] Khayyat A A: Al-Mujtama` al-Mutakāfil fī al-Islām,
McGraw-Hill: New Catholic Encyclopaedia, New York,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967, Vol 1 p 136.
[24] Catholic
Encyclopaedia Vol 1 p 136.
[25] Bible Society of
[26] Ibid Genesis
16: 2
[27] Holy
Bible: Genesis 30: 3 – 8.
[28] Ibid Genesis
48: 3 – 5.
[29] Ibid: Exodus
2: 1 – 10.
[30] Ibid: Esther
2: 7 & 15.
[31] Catholic
Encyclopaedia Vol 1 p 136.
[32] Holy
Bible: Exodus 4: 22 – 23.
[33] Ibid: Deuteronomy
32: 6.
[34]Ibid Romans
8: 16.
[35] Ibid: Galatians
4: 5.
[36] Ibid: Ephesians
1: 5.
[37][Ibid: Ruth
4: 17.
[38]Gottlieb N: A
Jewish Child is Born, New York,
Bloch Publishing Co., 1960, p 76.
[39] Roth C & Widoger G: The New Standard Jewish Encyclopaedia,
[40] Encyclopaedia
Judaica,
[41]Thomas J A C: A Textbook of Roman Law,
[42] Boberg P Q R:
The Law of Persons and the Family,
1977, 1st ed., p 350.
[43]These were the Children’s Act, Act 31 of 1937 followed by the Children’s Act, Act 33 of 1960 and the Children’s
Care Act, Act 74 of 1983.
[44]Child
Care Act, Section 2(2((3)
[45]Ibid Section 20(4).
[46]Boberg: The
Law of Persons and Family, p 642.
[47] Al-Qurtubī: Al-Jāmi` li Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, Vol 14 p 118.
Al-Mujtama` al-Mutakāfil fī
al-Islām, p 251.
Quṭub S: Fī Ẓilāl al-Qur’ān,
Makkah al-Mukarramah, 1972, 15th ed., Vol 6 p 123.
[48]Dangor S E: al-`Ilm,
[49] Al-Qaraḍāwī Y Al-Ḥalāl wa al-Ḥarām
fī al-Islām,
[50]Mukhtaṣār
Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim,
[51] Ṣābūnī M A: Rawā’i`u al-Bayān – Tafsīr
Āyāt al-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, Damascus & Makkah
al-Mukarramah, Maktabah al-Ghazālī, 1980, 1st ed.,
Vol 2 p 2623.
[52] San`ānī M: Subul al-Salām – Sharḥ Bulūgh al-Marām Min Adillah
al-Aḥkām,
[53]
`Uthmān: Āthār `Aqd
al-Zawāj, al-Riyāḍ, 1981
pp 365 - 367.
[54] Al-Birri Z A: Aḥkām al-Awlād
[55] The reason being that she gave birth to him.
In shī`ah law, an illegitimate
child is illegitimate to both parents.
[56] Meaning the Supreme Legislator i.e. Allāh Himself. The legislator in
law in the human sense is called the musharri`
to separate it completely from the
[57] Al-Qur’ān
2: 229
[58] Ibid 33: 37
[59] Ibid 33: 4 – 5.
[60] Ibn Kathīr I D: Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-`Aẓīm,
[61] Al-Qur’ān
33: 40.
[62] Al-Mujtama`
al-Mutakāfīl fī al-Islām p 218
Al-Ḥalāl wa al-Ḥarām
fī al-Islām p. 255.
[63] Meaning firm against any willful and
deliberate wrongdoing to Muslims on their part.
[64] Al-Qur’ān
48: 29.
[65] Ibid 49: 10.
[66][Ibid 76: 8.
[67] Ibid 2: 177.
[68][Mukhtaṣar
Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, p 472.
[69][Al-Nawawī A Z: Riyaḍ al-Sāliḥīn
min Kalām Sayyid al-Mursalīn,
[70]Mukhtaṣar
Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim p 474.
[71]In the event to the waṣīyyah exceeding one third of the deceased estate, the
warathah of the deceased have an
option; they may either condone the excess and allow the waṣīyyah of more than one third to be executed or they
can refuse, on grounds that the Shāri`
allowed them two thirds of the estate of their parent as a minimum unchallenged
share.
[72]Law 27 of 1975 legalised adoption of children
in Articles 110 & 114.
[73]Law 69 of 1959, Article 8 legalised adoption
with Articles 9 – 15 of the same law elaborating on the laws and its
application.
[74]See also the article on al-Ijtihād elsewhere in this journal.
[75]Shari`ah
is not the only source of law,
constitutionally, in
[76]The very same argument can be effectively
applied to fostering.
[77]Kamāli
M H: Principles of Islamic
Jurisprudence,
[78]Mahmood T: Personal
Laws of Islamic Countries,
[79] This, of course, refers to ijtihād mutlaq (absolute ijtihād based upon a new methodology) as opposed to other categories of ijtihād.
[80] Translated from Sa‘īd Ramaḍān
al-Būṭī, Hiwār
ḥawl mushkilāt ḥadārīyyah [Dār ul
Muttaḥidah,
[81] Dr al-Būṭī is a renowned Islamic scholar and media
personality who is currently Dean, Faculty of Islamic Law,
[82] The following sections have been translated by Auwais Rafudeen pp35-42
[83] We have
taken this definition from al-Baiḍāwī’s Al-Minhāj wal Uṣūl. Refer to Al-Asnawī’s
commentary upon this work together with the gloss by al-Bakhīt 4:524.
[84] Al-Risālah
of Imām Shāfi’ī, edited by Aḥmad Shākir, p29.
[85] Al-Muwāfaqāt
of Shātibī, 1:87-88
[86] See the
Irshād al-Fuḥūl by ash-Shawkānī, p. 24 ( Sa‘ādah
Printing House).
[87] Al-Muwāfaqāt 2:12
[88] Al-Risālah, Sections 961, 962 and 963 (edited by Aḥmad Shākir).
[89] Al-Mustaṣfā 2:354
[90] The following sections have been translated by Luqmaan Kajee pp42-50
[91] I`lŞm al-Mńqi`Ěn, volume 4, page 215
[92] Ťujjah AllŞh al-BŞlighah
[93] Nihāyat us-sūl bi sharḥ minhāj il-wuṣūl by al-Asnawī, with a gloss by al-Bakhīt, 4/575..
[94] Musallim al-Thubūt with the commentary Fawātiḥ al-Raḥamūt by ‘Abd ul Alā Niẓāmmuddīn al-‘Anṣārī 2/395.
[95] We say: constitute, for the major part, probable evidence cautiously out of moderation [al qanā‘ah al-shaksīyyah] which is ample enough to accommodate the solitary narration in the eyes of many people and that they are certain of it. It is important that such moderation is not incompatible with the issue of solitary narration that benefits probability. Many a time, unresolved arguments in this matter, and the reason why the different parties take opposite sides, is due to them not attending to this issue.
[96] Refer to what ImŞm Al-GhazzŞlĚ has at length mentioned in his book al-MustaîfŞ, 1/146
[97] The following sections have been translated by Shaykh Dawood Terblanche pp50-58
[98] We mean by this the matters of war and peace, everything that is connected to and that results from them. These cannot be decided except by the Imām [leader] of the Muslims as is well-known in the discussion around the area.
[99] Muwāfaqāt 4/89; Mustaṣfā 2/23
[100] The following sections have been translated by Shaykh Ebrahiem Moos pp58-end.
[101] We
discussed part of this topic in our book entitled ‘Alā ṭarīq
al- ̀awdah ilā al-Islām’
Pg.200
[102] In the 17th
meeting on Islamic Thought which was held in
[103]
Emery Edwin & Ault Philip
and Agree Warren, Introduction to mass Communication 3rd ed,
(New York: Dodd Medl and Company 1970), p. 4
[104]عبد
الله شحاته، الدعوة
الإسلامية والإعلام
الديني،
(القاهرة:
مكتبة وهبة،
دت.)، ص. 33
[105] محي الدين
عبد الحليم، الإعلام
الإسلامي
وتطبيقاته
العملية،
(مصر:
الخانجي، دت)
ص. 140-141